Government and Politics

South Korea

October 1973

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

38

WARNING

The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be released or shown to representatives of any foreign government or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1.

For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official purposes to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey.

Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification/control designations are:

(U/OU)	Unclassified/For Official Use Only
(C)	Confidential
(S)	Secret

South Korea

CONTENTS

This chapter supersedes the political coverage in the General Survey dated February 1970.

SECRET

FIGURES

Government and Politics

A. Introduction (C)

Since its formation in 1948 the Republic of Korea (ROK), or South Korea, has been controlled largely by a single individual or a small group of men. Rule by an elite reflects a centuries-old Korean tradition, based on Confucianism, under which government is viewed not as a contract but as a natural institution designed to maintain a proper relationship among men in the social hierarchy. The ideal ruler is a teacher able to instruct his inferiors in the rules of right conduct, and punitive powers ideally are employed only when subjects cannot be persuaded by reason and example. While this ideal still prevails in South Korea, most governments since 1948 have relied heavily on force and repression. An exception, the short-lived parliamentary government that held power between the overthrow of the first President, Syngman Rhee (Yi Sung-man), in April 1960 and the May 1961 military coup that brought President Pak Chong-hui to power, failed to govern effectively and was overthrown.

The traditional Korean view of society as an extended family ruled by a benevolent patriarch accommodates authoritarian leadership while at the same time encouraging factionalism and opposition. Personal and family ties tend to take precedence over the national interest, and political opposition shades into disloyalty. Under these circumstances, there is a tendency for a strong leader like President Pak to monopolize power in order to insure political stability; when leadership is weak, political stability deteriorates and government becomes ineffective.

Western ideas of democracy were introduced to Korea by American missionaries in the 1880's. Because the missionaries later became identified in the eyes of the Koreans with opposition to Japanese rule, the concept of democracy became popular, and after liberation in 1945 South Korea, with U.S. guidance, patterned its government on the Western democracies. The new institutions were not grounded in Korean social and political tradition, however, and have functioned only imperfectly. The extent to which successive governments have relied on autocratic methods has depended more on the political forces and the personalities at work at any given time than on constitutional principles.

From 1948 until the student revolution of April 1960 the Republic of Korea had a presidential form of government dominated by Rhee, who flouted or arbitrarily amended the constitution to consolidate the government's authority and his political control. Rhee's successors in 1960, reacting to the excesses of his highly personalized administration, adopted a parliamentary system similar to the British model. The presidency was reduced to largely ceremonial functions, and executive authority was vested in a Prime Minister and cabinet (State Council) responsible to a bicameral legislature. During the 4-month caretaker administration of Ho Chong and the 9-month administration of Prime Minister Chang Myon (John M. Chang) the government was more democratic than at any other time in Korean history. However, the leaders and people lacked the political maturity and experience to make the system work. Prey to the perennial factionalism of Korean life, they were unable to resolve the problems of corruption and mounting public disorder. The ensuing confusion aroused the fear of the military—until then largely apolitical—that rising neutralist sentiment might give added impetus to the regime's policy of reducing the size of the army and again expose the country to Communist aggression.

Most South Koreans reacted passively to the bloodless coup d'etat initiated by a small group of military leaders led by Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui in May 1961. However, a succession of high-level scandals and government crises caused by infighting within the junta soon marred its public image and led to popular disenchantment with the regime. Pressured by the United States and faced with growing domestic pressures, Pak agreed to return to constitutional government in 1963. He and his Democratic Republican Party won the essentially free elections that were held in late 1963, and on 17 December he

FIGURE 1. President Pak Chong-hui (C)

was inaugurated President (Figure 1). He was elected to a second 4-year term in 1967 and, after changing the constitution in 1969 to permit the President to seek a third term, he ran again and was reelected in 1971. In the latter race he faced a young articulate opponent who ran a close second. To ensure his continued tenure, Pak again changed the constitution in November 1972 to grant the President virtually unlimited powers. He was reelected to an expanded 6-year term in December 1972 by a 2,359-member "National Conference" set up to perform this function under the revised constitution.

Under Pak's firm leadership South Korea has come a long way. Much of the political and social unrest associated with the country's early years has been overcome, and impressive progress has been made with U.S. assistance in building a modern economy. Pak is also credited with improving the nation's international image. During the 1960's these achievements won him the support, or at least the acquiescence, of a large majority of the population, including a very broad spectrum of the political, military, bureaucratic, and economic elite. At the same time, however, traditionally vocal, reform-minded elements—students, intellectuals, and some members of the new middle class—who have denounced the regime's military orientation and purported widespread high-level official corruption were urging Pak to transfer power peacefully. They fear that the regime will follow the same path of repression and intimidation taken by Rhee.

To justify the 1972 constitutional changes granting him virtually dictatorial powers, Pak appealed to public fear of the "threat from the North" and called for greater national discipline in order to enable his government to deal with North Korea from a position of strength. While most informed South Koreans probably regret the sacrifice of democratic processes, many appear to agree with Pak that tighter controls are necessary. Nevertheless, the strong measures introduced by the government affect almost every segment of the society and run the risk of nurturing those very forces of dissension that Pak is seeking to hold in check.

Pak's decision to enter into a dialog with the Communist North in 1972 was motivated primarily by recognition of the need to bring South Korea's foreign policy—dominated for the most part by fear of an attack by the North—into step with the new mood of detente in East Asia. The changing international climate brought about by the Nixon Doctrine, the Sino-U.S. reconciliation, and Peking's entry into the United Nations have given rise to concern in both North and South Korea that their national interests will be subordinated to that of their principal mentors. In the case of South Korea, the leadership already foresees the time when all U.S. forces will have left Korea. Thus, Pak's primary purpose appears to be to use the intervening period to involve the North in a sufficiently complex relationship so that it will not be in P'yongyang's interests to renew hostilities when U.S. forces are gone. Although the official aim of both governments is the reunification of Korea, in the short run neither one expects anything more than an accommodation that will leave each in control of its respective area.

Nevertheless, in carrying on a dialog with the North, Pak runs several political risks. The appearance of too rapid progress could alarm the military, the ultimate arbiter of political power. Moreover, latent sentiment for unification could become aroused among younger Koreans. The passage of time has dimmed the public's memory of the Korean war, and the new generation now growing up is less persuaded that the Communist threat from the North justifies the regime's sharp curtailment of individual freedoms. Internationally, the dialog implies an equality between North and South that undercuts Seoul's longstanding claim to be the only legitimate Korean government. None of these difficulties is beyond the

ability of the regime to deal with under normal conditions, but they could, either collectively or singly, seriously weaken Pak's ability to maintain stability in the event the nation suffered a setback—particularly a downturn in the economy.

B. Structure and functioning of the government (U/OU)

1. Constitution

The constitution now in effect in South Korea was adopted in 1948 but has undergone a number of major revisions. The original document, which reflected the U.S. constitutional system of checks and balances, was revised under Syngman Rhee to strengthen the presidency vis-a-vis the legislature. The overthrow of the Rhee regime in 1960 led to drastic constitutional changes that stripped the presidency of almost all power and established a parliamentary form of government with a prime minister and a cabinet responsible to the lower house of a bicameral legislature. Parliamentary government was short-lived, however, falling victim in May 1961 to a military coup prompted by frustration with the ineffective cabinet system and the failure of the government to improve economic conditions. In the process of transforming itself into a civilian administration, the military junta again rewrote the constitution and reinstituted a strong presidential-style government. The constitution next underwent major revision in November 1972 to give the President sweeping new powers at the expense of the legislative and judicial branches.

The constitution as amended in 1972 provides for a government that has similarities to that established in France by the Gaullist constitution of 1958. Like the French Government, it combines aspects of both the presidential and parliamentary systems: a powerful President, a Prime Minister and cabinet, and a National Assembly (in Korea's case unicameral). Other points of similarity include special committees or councils empowered to rule on the constitutionality of laws and to oversee the conduct of elections and national referendums. Substantively, however, the powers granted to the President under the South Korean constitution are so broad and the checks on his authority by the legislative and judicial branches so weak as to make him virtually an absolute ruler.

The Korean constitution as amended pays lipservice to the traditional social and political rights of the individual citizen which are provided in the fundamental laws of most Western democracies. The extensive list of civil and political rights includes privacy of correspondence, freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly, and association; equality before the law; freedom from arbitrary arrest; the right to elect public officials and to hold elective office; and the right of the accused to have the prompt assistance of counsel and a speedy trial. No citizen may be prosecuted for a criminal offense retroactively, nor may he be placed in double jeopardy. In the social and cultural fields the constitution guarantees the freedom of science and art, compulsory and free elementary education, and welfare benefits for persons incapable of earning a living. The constitution also specifies the right as well as the duty to work and provides for freedom of choice of occupation and the right to bargain collectively. In case of the expropriation, use, or restriction of private property for public purposes, due compensation is to be paid in accordance with the law.

These constitutional liberties and rights are so highly qualified, however, as to be almost meaningless. The constitution empowers the government to set legal limits on the citizens' exercise of their rights, authorizes censorship of motion pictures and dramas to protect public morals and ethics, and subjects freedom of the press to the requirements that the press "shall not impugn the personal honor or rights of an individual, nor shall it infringe upon public morality." It also has authority to set standards for the physical plants of newspapers and wire services. Existing legislation is so broadly drawn that the government is able to selectively control what is to appear in the public media. The time and place of outdoor assembly are subject to the provisions of the law. The right to own property is qualified by the constitutional requirement that the "exercise of property rights shall conform to public welfare." The state is granted broad powers to regulate and coordinate economic affairs within the "limits necessary for the public interest." It may further take over the ownership or management of private enterprises "in cases determined by law to meet an urgent necessity of national defense or the national economy."

The regime justifies the authoritarian character of the revised constitution on grounds of the rapidly changing international conditions in East Asia and the need to achieve "the aspirations of the Korean people for peace, unification, and prosperity." While the curtailment of democratic government is abhorrent to many Koreans, particularly Westernized ones, the changes are in line with Korea's long experience with government by one man or a small group. The

changes also reflect the ability of most Koreans to acquiesce in what the regime ordains without being overly troubled by the inconsistency between declarations of democratic principles and autocratic practices.

Amendments to the constitution may be proposed by either the President or a majority of the members of the National Assembly. In the former case, the proposed amendment must be submitted to a referendum of a majority of the voters eligible to vote for members of the National Assembly, and must win the approval of a majority of those voting. The referendum must be held between 20 and 60 days after the public announcement of the proposed amendment.

When an amendment is proposed by the National Assembly, the process is more cumbersome. The proposal must first be approved by a two-thirds majority of the members of the National Assembly, after which it has to be passed by a simple majority of the National Conference for Unification, a constitutional body of electors established under the 1972 revision and controlled by the President. The National Assembly vote must be taken between 20 and 60 days from the time the proposed amendment is made public; the National Council for Unification must vote within 20 days of the time the amendment is referred to it by the National Assembly.

2. Executive

a. Presidential powers

The President is granted virtually unrestricted power to govern on his own authority. His office is independent from and superior to the legislature and the judiciary. He is both chief of state and head of government. He represents the state vis-a-vis foreign states by accrediting, receiving, and dispatching diplomatic envoys. With the concurrence of the National Assembly he concludes and ratifies treaties and declares war and concludes peace. He is Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and Chairman of the State Council, or cabinet, the highest policymaking body in the executive branch. The President appoints cabinet ministers, office directors, ambassadors, heads of government agencies, judges, and other senior public officials. He has the authority to grant amnesties, commute sentences, and award decorations and other honors. To fulfill his executive responsibilities, the President is empowered to issue orders and decrees for enforcement of the laws and to propose legislation for enactment by the National Assembly or, when he deems it necessary, to call for national referendums. He also participates in the legislative process through his authority to sign or veto bills passed by the National Assembly, which he has the power to dissolve.

The constitution gives the President broad emergency powers to issue ordinances having the effect of law in time of national calamity or grave financial or economic crisis, and when public safety and order "is seriously threatened or anticipated to be threatened." Such ordinances may deal with the "whole range" of internal, foreign, defense, economic, financial and judicial affairs, and may provide for the temporary suspension of all civil and political rights. The only limitation placed on the President's emergency powers is that he notify the National Assembly without delay of what measures he is taking and that he immediately terminate them when the need is ended or when requested to do so by a majority of the members of the National Assembly. He need not comply with their request, however, if he decides that there are "compelling reasons" for not doing so, nor are the measures he takes subject to review by the courts.

The President is required to declare a state of martial law in time of war, or when it becomes necessary to mobilize the armed forces "to maintain public safety and order." Two levels of martial law are provided for: precautionary (undefined by the constitution), and extraordinary. In the latter case special measures restrict an individual's freedom from arbitrary arrest, the freedom of speech, press, assembly and association, and the "rights and powers of the executive or the judiciary." The constitutional requirement that the President notify the National Assembly of his action is the same for martial law as for a state of emergency, except that he does not have the option of overriding a request by a majority of the National Assembly to end martial law.

The constitution provides that the President shall be nominated and elected by the members of the National Conference for Unification. The voting must be by secret ballot and without debate. If no candidate on either the first or second ballot receives the requisite simple majority of votes, the election will be resolved by a runoff between the two leading contenders. In the event that more than two candidates are tied on the second ballot, a plurality of the votes on the third ballot will be sufficient to elect.

The election of the President must be held at least 30 days prior to the end of each presidential term, the duration of which is 6 years. There is no limitation on the number of times an incumbent can succeed himself.

The constitution does not provide for a vice president. If the presidency becomes prematurely vacant, the National Conference for Unification has 3 months to select a successor to serve out the remainder of the unexpired term unless it is shorter than 1 year, in which case the Prime Minister serves until a new President is elected. There is no constitutional provision for electing a successor in the event the President becomes incapacitated and is unable to perform his duties. Under these circumstances, or when the office is vacant, the Prime Minister or, if he is unavailable, the next ranking cabinet member acts in the President's stead.

To remove the chance of conflict of interest, the President may not concurrently hold any other official or private position, or engage in private business, except as specified in the constitution. He may be impeached if a majority of the members of the National Assembly propose such action and two-thirds of the total membership approve it. Otherwise, the President may not be charged with any criminal offense during his tenure "except for insurrection or treason." If the Assembly votes to impeach the President, its action apparently must then be reviewed by the Constitution Committee, a quasi-judicial body appointed by the President. The constitution is vague on this point, however.

b. State Council

The President directs the work of the executive branch through the State Council, or cabinet, which is made up of 15 to 35 members.[1] The State Council deliberates on major government policies, issues affecting the nation, and the appointment of senior civil and military officials. It has no decisionmaking power; the President is solely responsible for deciding all important executive matters. Under the constitution, however, all presidential acts must be countersigned by the Prime Minister and "by the members of the State Council concerned." Because the President holds practically unlimited power to dismiss the Prime Minister and members of the State Council, the right to countersign state documents is ineffective in curbing presidential power.

In mid-1973 the State Council was composed of the President, who is chairman; the Prime Minister, who is vice chairman; the Deputy Prime Minister, who serves concurrently as chairman of the Economic Planning Board; the heads of the 15 executive ministries; and two ministers without portfolio. In addition, the Vice Minister of Government Administration, the chiefs of the Presidential and Prime Ministerial Secretariats, and the heads of the Offices of Legislation, Veterans Administration, and Planning Control may attend cabinet meetings as observers.

The Prime Minister is appointed by the President, with the approval of the National Assembly. As the President's chief executive assistant, the Prime Minister supervises the executive ministries, but his role vis-a-vis the President—like that of other cabinet members—is advisory only.

State Council members are appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. Members of the armed forces are ineligible to serve unless they are retired from active service. State Council members can be removed from office either by the President, upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister, or by the National Assembly. In the latter case, the concurrence of one-third of the members of the Assembly is required to propose the removal of a cabinet member, including the Prime Minister, and a majority to adopt the motion. When a no-confidence motion is passed against the Prime Minister, the President must remove the entire cabinet. The National Assembly may also remove individual members of the State Council from office by a complicated procedure of impeachment.

c. Other executive bodies

The President is assisted by two other advisory bodies: the National Security Council and the Economic and Scientific Council. The former advises him on matters of foreign, military, and domestic policy related to national security before he refers these matters to the cabinet. The latter advises him on economic and scientific development.

Other agencies directly supervised by the President are the Board of Inspection and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Board of Inspection audits the government's fiscal records and inspects the management practices of executive agencies and public officials. The board reports to both the President and the National Assembly. The chairman of the Board is appointed by the President with the approval of the National Assembly. The CIA coordinates and supervises the activities of all the government's intelligence and investigative agencies, engages in anti-Communist operations, and conducts political investigations.

The heads of the ministries are selected by the President and are ex officio members of the cabinet. The Prime Minister supervises all the ministries, the Economic Planning Board, the Territorial Unification

[1] For a current listing of key government officials, consult *Chief of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

Board, and the Offices of Veterans Administration, of Legislation, and of Planning Control. In practice, however, the Deputy Prime Minister supervises the Economic Planning Board and the economic ministries. The Ministry of Government Administration has a special relationship to the Prime Minister, assisting him in supervising the executive ministries. The organization of the government in mid-1973 is shown in Figure 2.

The executive ministries are aided by a number of state-operated, quasi-autonomous organizations whose chief officers are appointed by the President on the recommendation of the minister concerned. The more important of these bodies are the Bank of Korea (the central financial institution), the Korean Development Bank, the Korea Electric Power Co., the Korea Shipping Corp., the Korean Tungsten Mining Co., the National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation, the Korean Heavy Industries Corp., the Korean Housing Corp., the Korea Trade Promotion Corp., and the National Council of Fishery Cooperatives.



FIGURE 2. Structure of government, June 1973 (U/OU)

3. Legislature

Legislative power is exercised by the National Assembly, a unicameral body for most of its life, although it was briefly bicameral during 1960-62. The present Assembly has 219 seats: 146 of the members elected for 6-year terms by direct popular vote and 73 selected for 3-year terms by the National Conference for Unification from a list of candidates supplied by the President. This system was devised to help assure government control of the legislature. Prior to the November 1972 constitutional revision, the Assembly had a total of 204 members, 44 of whom were selected by a system of proportional representation which the Pak regime introduced so as to assure it of a majority in the legislature.

As provided by the constitution, the expulsion of an Assembly member can be effected only by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly. Such action cannot be appealed to the courts. Assemblymen are protected by the constitution from arrest or detention when the Assembly is in session, except if caught in the act of committing a crime. The same protection is afforded an assemblyman arrested or detained by the authorities prior to a session if the Assembly asks that he be released for the duration of the pending session. An assemblyman is responsible neither to the executive nor to the courts for anything he says on the floor of the legislature or for the way he votes. The constitution stipulates that assemblymen may not abuse their position to benefit themselves or anyone else, nor may they concurrently hold any other public or private position except "as determined by law."

The National Assembly must convene annually and is subject to special sessions at the call of the President or at the request of one-third or more of its members. The 1972 revision of the constitution limits the number of sessions to one regular session a year of no more than 90 days and two special sessions of a maximum of 30 days each. Special sessions which are called by the President are excepted, however, and are not counted as part of the total limit of 150 days. The President determines the length of special sessions and sets their agenda.

The National Assembly elects one speaker and two vice speakers, one of whom traditionally is a member of the opposition. As in the U.S. Congress, the committee system is an important element in the legislative process. There are two kinds of committees: standing committees—usually one for each of the government ministries—and temporary or special committees. The latter includes the Special Committee on Budget and Settlement, which is called into being whenever the budget is studied. All Assembly sessions are open to the public unless a majority of the members present or the Speaker decides otherwise for "reasons of national security."

The President or any assemblyman may introduce a bill. Every bill passed by the legislature must be promulgated by the President within 15 days or returned with his veto to the Assembly for reconsideration. The President may not request the Assembly to reconsider a bill in part or with proposed amendments. The National Assembly can override a veto by a two-thirds vote of those members present, provided their number constitutes a quorum. (The attendance of one-third or more members constitutes a quorum for doing business, except that half or more are required for voting.) A law becomes effective 20 days after the date of promulgation unless otherwise stipulated.

The National Assembly considers and decides on budgets, consents to the ratification of treaties, and concurs in the declaration of war and the dispatch of the armed forces overseas. Cabinet members, if requested, must attend any meetings of the Assembly and answer questions.

Despite the independent status granted the National Assembly by the constitution, the legislature has been reduced to little more than a limited debating club and a rubberstamp for the regime. Legislative control over the budget, previously already weak, was virtually eliminated by the 1972 constitutional changes. Only the executive can draw up the budget, which the Assembly can either accept or reject but not alter without the government's permission. The Assembly is supposed to pass on the budget within 30 days prior to the beginning of the fiscal year (which in South Korea corresponds to the calendar year), but if it fails to do so the executive can authorize expenditures for continuing government operations. The regime's grip on the legislative process was further strengthened by the power acquired by the President in 1972 to appoint one-third of the Assembly's membership through the National Conference for Unification (NCU). Whereas in the past he frequently had to resort to bribery, political favoritism, and occasional intimidation to secure the passage of unpopular legislation, he is now virtually assured of a tame majority to do his bidding. Moreover, elimination of the annual review of ministries by the Assembly removes still another check on government authority.

4. National Conference for Unification

The NCU was added to the government structure by the November 1972 revision of the constitution. Its purpose is to assure the President of a popular

mandate to "pursue peaceful unification of the fatherland." The constitution states that the Conference shall be the "depository of the national sovereignty" and provides that whenever the President requests it to deliberate on "important unification policies," a vote of a majority of the members "shall be regarded as the collective will of the people as a whole." The NCU also serves as a board of electors for the President and for a third of the members of the National Assembly. Because the President has almost total control over the selection of the NCU's membership and actions, Pak is virtually assured of its complete support.

The President serves concurrently as chairman of the Conference. It meets at his discretion, and he determines its agenda and procedures, including its methods of voting and of counting ballots. Members are prohibited by law from objecting to or expressing opinions about decisions the chairman makes. Prior to addressing the Conference, a member must submit to the chairman for his approval an outline of proposed remarks, and the chairman is empowered to silence any speaker who deviates from an approved text. A 20- to 50-man steering committee judges the qualifications of the NCU members and may discipline them. Committee members are appointed by the chairman and serve at his pleasure.

The constitution provides that the NCU shall have between 2,000 and 5,000 members. The present Conference, elected on 15 December 1972, has 2,359 members from 1,630 election districts. (See Political Dynamics, below, for discussion of NCU election laws.) Rural districts are coterminous with the local townships (*myon*), and urban districts with the wards (*gu*). The wards are entitled to one NCU member for each 20,000 voters up to a maximum of five. NCU members, who are elected for 3-year terms, serve without pay and may hold other jobs. They must be at least 30 years old.

5. Judiciary

Judicial authority is exercised by a system of courts whose judges theoretically are bound to act independently of the other branches of the government and in accordance with the constitution and the law. In practice, however, the South Korean judiciary occupies a less influential position than the legislative and executive arms of the government. The independence of the judiciary is limited by Korean judicial tradition, which prevents most judges from arriving at decisions which are in marked opposition to the government's desires. This tendency of judges to look to the executive for guidance has been strengthened by changes in the law in early 1973 giving greater powers to prosecutors in criminal cases. Nevertheless, individual judges on occasion have shown considerable courage in rendering independent judgments.

The Supreme Court's power of judicial review has been substantially curtailed by the November 1972 changes to the constitution. The Court continues to be the final arbiter of the constitutionality of administrative orders and regulations issued by the executive branch, but when the constitutionality of legislation enacted by the National Assembly is at issue, the Court must request a decision by a new nine-man board called the Constitution Committee. Committee members are appointed by the President for 6 years. Three of the members are chosen from a list of nominees submitted to the President by the National Assembly, and three others from a list made up by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. No committee member may be removed from office except by impeachment or criminal punishment. The committee is also charged by the constitution with deciding on the impeachment of public officials and on the dissolution of political parties.

Korean jurisprudence combines elements—often competing—of Chinese classical thought, the continental European legal tradition, and Anglo-American law. The constitution specifically guarantees that all citizens are equal before the law, but the criminal code reflects the classical Chinese belief that public officials should be men of superior virtue and thus deserve greater punishment than ordinary men if they commit criminal offenses. Also, if a man kills, injures, or harms his or his spouse's parents or grandparents, the punishment is especially severe, reflecting the Oriental respect for old age. Despite statutory and constitutional provisions designed to restrict the admissibility of evidence, courts often permit the introduction of hearsay and irrelevant testimony. Involuntary confessions, and evidence obtained as a result of illegal searches.

In the continental European manner, Korean judges take a more active role in trial procedure than do their English or U.S. counterparts. Trials are conducted in open court, without juries, and before one or more judges. Korean judges decide on witnesses to be called, upon the request of the prosecutor or the defense counsel, and they may examine or cross-examine witnesses after the initial inquiry by the prosecutor and the defense counsel. The extensive role of the judge places a high premium not only on his knowledge of the law but also on his integrity. Despite

some pay increases, the low salaries received by judges have encouraged many to accept bribes or to leave the field altogether.

The court system functions on three levels: at the highest level is the Supreme Court; at the middle are three High (appellate) Courts; and at the lowest are nine district courts and their 36 branch courts. In addition, there is a system of family and juvenile courts. The Supreme Court is empowered to establish procedures for trials and for the internal regulation of all the courts.

The three appellate courts—located in Seoul, Taegu, and Kwangju—hear appeals from the lower courts. The district courts in each provincial capital, including Seoul and Pusan, have original jurisdiction over most cases. A bench composed of three judges presides over serious criminal cases. To hear cases in outlying areas, a district court may set up branch courts, each with a single judge; it may also appoint circuit judges to tour its area and try minor offenses. One of the judges in a district court may be designated to sit as a summary court for petty offenses—a procedure patterned after the police courts in the United States. Military trials are handled by military tribunals, but the Supreme Court has the final appellate jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court may have a maximum of 16 justices; the bench reached this number in late 1969, but as of mid-1973 it had only 13. The Chief Justice is appointed by the President with the consent of the National Assembly; his term of office is 6 years. Associate justices and other judges are appointed by the President on recommendation of the Chief Justice. All may be reappointed. Compulsory retirement age for the Chief Justice and other justices of the Supreme Court is 65, and for all other judges 60. Although judges can be forced to resign if found to have a "mental or physical" defect, they theoretically may not be dismissed, suspended, have their salaries reduced, or "suffer from other unfavorable measures," except by process of impeachment, criminal punishment, or disciplinary action. In practice, however, the membership of the Supreme Court was extensively reshuffled during the 1972-73 governmental reorganization.

Several factors have weakened public confidence in the courts. A severe shortage of judges has resulted in overloaded trial dockets and in cases being decided without sufficient time allowed for careful consideration. There were only 407 judges in 1971, or 1 for about 80,450 persons—as compared with 1 judge for some 19,600 people in the United States in 1970. Judges have sometimes delayed civil suits rather than adjudicate them, so as to encourage litigants to settle out of court. Also of public concern is the fact that the Supreme Court rarely reviewed the constitutionality of enacted legislation, when it had the authority to do so prior to November 1972, nor does it question the validity of executive orders, even though it has this responsibility. Although theoretically bound to act independently of other branches of government, judicial authorities seldom overturn the decisions of law-enforcement agencies. The judiciary actually hews to an old tradition of the inquisitory trial system whereby it complements, rather than rules on, the operations of law-enforcement agencies. The court allows the liberal issuance of warrants, infrequently grants bail, and rarely holds that the activities of law-enforcement agencies conflict with due process. Once a warrant is issued and a suspect apprehended, there is little chance of his escaping confinement. In fact, the prosecution is able to dispose of half of the cases involving law-enforcement decisions without even resorting to trial. Under the circumstances, the people are reluctant to resort to judicial process and consider the judiciary a sort of authoritative institution insensitive to their interests.

6. Local government

Korean governments have always been highly centralized. Despite the passage since World War II of laws calling for greater local autonomy local government is still largely an extension of the central government. Most South Koreans live in tightly knit, largely self-sufficient, small rural communities where local activities traditionally have been managed through a system of headmen or village elders. The villagers present a united front against outsiders and have even managed in many cases to resist central government controls. In national elections, however, their vote often is manipulated by the police and other representatives of central authority.

The country is divided into nine provinces (*do*) and two special cities, Seoul and Pusan, which have administrative status equal to that of the provinces. Below the provincial level of government are two principal subdivisions: the city (*si*) or county (*gun*), and the town (*up*) or township (*myon*). The towns and townships have equivalent status. Because of the booming population and the rapid changes in the industrial structure during the 1960's, the number of cities—urban areas with 50,000 or more population—increased from 25 in 1960 to 30 in 1970. The village (*ri*) is the lowest formal administrative unit of government. Cities are usually divided into wards (*gu*) and blocks (*dong*); villages are organized into groups

of neighboring families called subvillages (*pan*). In the *ri* and *pan* the government sponsors a variety of civic organizations and youth groups, which it also uses for controlling the people and giving them political guidance. These associations sometimes also serve as informer networks for the police authorities.

Throughout Korean history the village has been the traditional seat of local autonomy. The headman serves as the link between the people and the *up* and *myon* chiefs, who are salaried employees of the central government. Village headmen, who are selected by the villagers themselves, are not government officials and receive no salaries. Other influential persons in the village may be the scion of an old, aristocratic family, a former village chief, the school principal, teachers, or simply the oldest males. Leadership requirements seem to vary from village to village, but generally education, persuasive ability, moral rectitude, and sagacity—the latter regarded as an earmark of old age—are the key qualifications.

Under the constitution of 1948 the President appointed provincial governors and, through the Ministry of Home Affairs, controlled the assignment of both police and judicial officials. Local and provincial councils and some local administrative officials were elected by their districts and had limited independent legislative and fiscal powers. After the overthrow of Syngman Rhee, the short-lived Chang Myon government completely discarded the presidential appointment system and decreed that all local leaders were to be elected. Despite a provision in its 1962 constitution for a system of limited local autonomy, the military junta which ousted Chang in May 1961 returned to the previous appointment system. When the regime substantially amended the constitution in November 1972, it added a provision further delaying the implementation of those portions of the constitution providing for local autonomy "until the unification of the fatherland has been achieved."

Local governments are supervised directly from Seoul, with provincial governors and the mayors of Seoul and Pusan appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. Mayors of other cities and heads of counties are appointed by the Prime Minister on the recommendation of the Ministry of Home Affairs, which also appoints and controls local administrative staffs. A decision in 1972 to transfer many regulatory functions (e.g., the licensing of bathhouses) from the provincial to the local level of government, for the purpose of greater administrative efficiency, has had only minimal impact because of the Korean tendency to buck decisions up to the next higher authority.

Local governments raise some funds through local taxes but the central government normally provides most of the funds for local budgets. In its drive for modernization and efficiency after the 1961 coup, the junta made the *gun* the primary unit of local administration, downgrading the traditional *up* and *myon*. It revised the local tax structure to improve the *gun*'s financial status and to increase the portion of local expenditures paid for from local revenue. Nevertheless, the potential for independent local action has increased only slightly, since over half the funds derived by the *gun* from local taxes are spent on duties delegated to the *gun* by the central government.

7. Bureaucracy

The structure and the operation of the bureaucracy has been greatly influenced by the pattern established during the Japanese administration of the country. The government service is characterized by relative youth and vigor in key positions, many senior posts have been filled by former military officers. Many appointees have had limited training in the fields of their responsibility, however, and there is frequent shifting of key personnel, with a consequent loss of continuity of operations. Although this shifting is less a factor than it used to be, it continues to be a cause of administrative inefficiency.

Traditionally, the civil service had the greatest prestige and was regarded as one of the most honorable professions; it embodied the highest social and political aspirations of an individual because it usually insured wealth, power, and social status. After 1945 the traditional deference accorded officialdom by the people diminished substantially, but in a society such as South Korea's where the government is the principal employer and regulates and controls economic activity to a considerable degree, and where the so-called *kwanjon minpi* ("officialdom exalted and people downgraded") attitude is still very much a part of the culture, the civil service provides one of the most desired and expedient avenues to prestige, influence, and wealth.

The civil service system familiar in the West was introduced into South Korea in August 1949 when the National Assembly enacted the Civil Service Law. A new National Civil Service Law promulgated in 1963 has continued to operate. The civil service is made up of national and local government employees who are recruited, selected, and appointed by executive agencies of the central and local government. Officials of the central government generally have more prestige than their local counterparts, mainly because local officials have subordinate status in that they perform functions delegated to them by the central government.

Promotions, according to the National Civil Service Law, are based on efficiency ratings, experience, merit, and competitive examinations. The Central Officials Training Institute of the Ministry of Government Administration offers short-term, intensive, technical instruction to civil servants, including judges and prosecutors. Special training also is provided by the Graduate School of Public Administration of Seoul National University to familiarize public officials with the "higher aspects of the administrative sciences." Ministries themselves sponsor their own training programs. Appointees are required to serve a prescribed conditional period before being accorded regular status. A civil servant may not be discharged against his will without cause, as provided in the basic statute. Aggrieved parties have recourse to a Board of Appeals.

Despite the emphasis placed by the law on the merit system, nepotism and family influence play an important role in the civil service. In a society still dominated by the Confucian emphasis on the family, officials often put family considerations ahead of the public interest when making appointments. Also in such a society it is frequently only prudent for a bureaucrat to surround himself with people whose personal loyalty is assured.

The South Korean civil service is youthful, and despite strong emphasis on college education for the higher grades, the overall educational level is rather low. A relatively small number of the civil servants hold college degrees. No single particular group dominates the civil service, although graduates from Seoul National University's law school occupy many of the high-ranking posts in the central ministries. All social classes are represented.

C. Political dynamics (C)

1. Characteristics of Korean politics

South Korea's political structure is complex and inherently unstable. Many of its forms and objectives superficially resemble those of Western political systems, but fundamental political attitudes are rooted in an older heritage that emphasizes personal and family ties over the national interest. Much of the instability and corruption in Korean political life stems from the contradictions inherent in these contending forces. This situation has been aggravated by population pressure, by the unnatural division of the homeland between two hostile and competing regimes, and by the need to rebuild and modernize a war-shattered economy.

The key element in the political system is the competition for power, wealth, and prestige through maneuver and intrigue by leaders who have built up personal followings for this purpose. Within this system persons tend to be loyal to individuals and factions—not to ideals or to parties on the basis of broad principles. As a result, South Korean politics are a constant interplay between various groups and groups-within-groups, challenging the government's authority and struggling among themselves. Under a strong leader like President Pak Chong-hui, government tends to become authoritarian so that political stability can be maintained. During times of weak leadership political stability deteriorates and government becomes ineffective.

National awakening during the period of Japanese rule, widespread literacy, and years of political competition with Communist North Korea have developed a higher degree of political awareness in South Korea than in many other emerging nations. This is especially evident in the cities, where members of the professions, businessmen, intellectuals, students, and other persons make up a political elite. Political awareness is less developed among the rural population—partly from lack of exposure to the channels of political communication and partly from traditional indifference to politics. The gap in political interest between town and country is decreasing, however, in large measure because of the gradual improvement in rural communications, increasing population mobility between city and countryside, and the spread of public education in rural areas.

The Korean attitude toward governmental authority traditionally is one of distrust and hostility, despite the age-old Confucian deference to magistrates. This attitude, fostered by centuries of rapacious native rule and 40 years of Japanese repression, has changed only slightly since liberation in 1945. Government officials commonly assume a domineering attitude toward the people they are supposed to serve, and the Korean citizen often must pay under the table for the most routine public services that his American counterpart takes for granted.

The inadequacy of the salaries paid to civil servants has led to widespread corruption among government officials, who rely on graft to supplement their incomes. At the lower and middle levels of the bureaucracy the distribution of these funds frequently is formalized—the recipient taking so much for himself, while the remainder is divided among his superiors and, in some cases, a communal fund which members can draw on to help meet family

emergencies. Such practices become unacceptable to the South Korean people only when official demands become excessive. The tendency to exceed allowable bounds, however, is strong. At the highest levels of government the sums involved in graft are much larger, probably running into the tens of millions of dollars annually. Most of this takes the form of kickbacks by businesses and financial institutions. Some of it goes directly into the pockets of top officials, but the largest share probably is used to finance the regime's political apparatus.

Government repression has also marked the South Korean political scene. The traditional view of society as an extended family ruled over by a benevolent patriarch does not allow for the concept of a loyal opposition; Korean values of personal honor and prestige permit only one leader. Persons with authority naturally seek to suppress even legitimate criticism, while those who aspire to power are not particular about how they achieve it. Moreover, because of the tendency of South Koreans to personalize the conduct of government, key civilian and military officials, who owe their loyalty directly to the President, can never be sure of surviving unscathed any transfer of power, even a constitutional one. Thus there is a strong tendency for governments to cling to power and even a once highly popular regime will reach a point where it relies on progressively greater repression in order to cling to office.

2. Political groupings

a. Ruling groups

Three groups—two composed of civilian politicians and the third of military leaders-turned-politicians—have dominated political life since 1945. Members of the first group gained their political experience in the Korean independence movement during Japanese rule as members of clandestine organizations in Korea or of groups in exile. Their political activity was influenced by Western concepts and infused with revolutionary zeal. The leaders' thinking was colored by the need during their early careers to maintain secrecy and confine their primary activities to anti-Japanese propaganda, agitation, and occasional acts of terrorism. While concerned with developing firm popular support, they devoted themselves largely to engaging in factional maneuvering, raising funds, and enhancing their personal prestige and following. This elite of former expatriates dominated the membership of the Liberal Party (LP), which was founded in 1951 by President Rhee and monopolized political power until his overthrow in April 1960. It was rigidly conservative, violently anti-Communist, and buttressed its power by manipulating several mass organizations, the police, and the bureaucracy. Graft and factionalism prevailed.

The members of the second group were politicians who opposed the LP and who coalesced to form the Democratic Party (DP) in 1955. The members of the DP, like many of their LP counterparts, grew up in a Korea dominated by the Japanese and were influenced largely by Westerners—mostly U.S. educators and missionaries. They were as conservative as Rhee's LP and as prone to factionalism and corruption, although less authoritarian. The DP was the chief opposition to Rhee and his party and fought the LP largely on the issue of the ruling party's "autocratic" practices. Following the April 1960 revolution, the DP was swept into power virtually unopposed by the National Assembly elections of July 1960. Organized along parliamentary lines in the British manner, the new government was the most democratic but least effective the South Koreans have experienced. Incessant bickering and factional infighting brought government almost to a halt. The economy and public order, already in bad shape as a result of the Rhee regime's maladministration, continued to deteriorate. During the 9 months preceding the military coup of May 1961, the DP government was led by Prime Minister Chang Myon; the titular chief of state was President Yun Po-sun.

The third and youngest group to govern South Korea is made up of the military officers—retired or then on active duty—who formed the junta that seized power in 1961 and 2 years later made the transition to civil administration. They have remained in power ever since. Individual military men had been politically prominent in the past, but the 1961 coup introduced the military into the political arena for the first time as a group. Although some of these persons originally were trained under the Japanese, they are predominantly a postwar elite. They have demonstrated considerable drive and administrative skill, but like their civilian predecessors they are not immune to corruption and factionalism.

At the center of the small group of military officers who conceived the coup was a number of young, narrowly nationalistic colonels, led by Kim Chong-p'il (Figure 3), who were critical of their superiors and found further promotion blocked by persons only a year or two older than themselves. Aligned with the colonels were a number of disgruntled generals who had fared badly in factional contests with colleagues and hoped to recoup their losses.

FIGURE 3. Prime Minister Kim Chong-p'il (C)

The key figure in the coup group was Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui. Unlike the other generals associated with the coup, Pak belonged to a small elite of officers who were graduates of Japan's imperial military academies and who had dominated the South Korean armed forces since the Korean war. He was also both a close friend and a relative by marriage of Kim Chong-p'il. These ties, together with a high reputation among his fellow officers for professionalism and personal honesty, made it possible for Pak to appeal to and receive the political loyalty of a very wide section of the South Korean officer corps.

Pak in 1963, after considerable maneuvering and strong pressure from U.S. authorities, restored civilian administration and won what was an essentially free election in 1963 and again in 1967. In 1969 he had the constitution changed to remove the limitation on the President serving more than two terms, and he was again reelected in 1971. As part of a sweeping reorganization of the government the following year, Pak had himself elected for a 6-year term by a handpicked college of 2,359 electors. The new constitution incorporating these changes gives Pak virtually unlimited power.

Pak's political views reflect an amalgam of his early Japanese training and traditional Korean values. Unlike his civilian predecessors, he has never been directly influenced by Western political concepts. While he publicly pays lipservice to democratic principles, Pak, a rather austere person and authoritarian in outlook, is concerned primarily with the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, not its rights and privileges. Revealingly, he has compared his own role as President to that of a physician who may temporarily have to restrain his patient "for the sake of complete cure and recovery, and even force him to submit to painful surgery." Although most Koreans hardly find this point of view novel or even disagree with it, there is the danger that prolonged and rigid one-man rule will stifle the normal venting of political tensions and frustrations, thus reducing the prospect for a peaceful transfer of power when Pak goes.

Under Pak's strong leadership much of the turmoil associated with South Korea's early years has been overcome. Public order and political stability have been strengthened, helping to lay the foundation for the country's impressive economic development during the 1960's. The price of political stability, however, has been a further weakening of representative government.

Most South Koreans appear to have accepted the loss of political freedom as necessary to retain the economic progress and military security that Pak has demonstrated he can provide. The regime is quite popular with the military, who provide Pak's ultimate source of authority. It is least acceptable to the intellectuals and students, who are critical of its military orientation and condemn what they believe to be widespread official corruption and the use of police-state tactics.

b. Political parties

South Koreans have had little success developing Western-style political parties. Except for the Communists, who have been suppressed since the early 1950's, parties have been unable to build strong institutional traditions or popular loyalties. None of the major parties has offered the electorate a real political choice, since all have been basically conservative, strongly nationalistic, and committed to the reunification of Korea on non-Communist terms. In their programs the parties have advocated economic development and close ties with the United States, while remaining generally skeptical of Japan's intentions toward their country. Thus political questions have centered essentially on the issue of the "outs" versus the "ins" rather than on policies or principles.

Under Japanese rule, political parties were banned. After liberation in 1945 organized political groups proliferated, but their role in national life was at best only imperfectly understood by the South Koreans. By mid-1947 there were some 40 recognizable political organizations of varying persuasions and sizes, including the South Korean Labor (Communist) Party (SKLP)—a descendant of the pre-1945 Korean Communist Party—and the Korean Democratic Party, a forerunner of the present New Democratic Party. With the notable exception of the SKLP, most of these groups amounted to little more than political clubs of provincial politicians, each with an insignificant number of followers who were attracted by regional, kinship, or other personal ties. In the 1950 National Assembly elections, for example, 66% of all candidates ran as independents; they accounted for over half the total number of elected representatives.

President Rhee in December 1951 established the Liberal Party as a nationwide organization to provide a popular base for the regime. This move led the great majority of Rhee's political opponents to join together to form the Democratic Party. Any trend toward fewer and more broadly based political parties, however, was more apparent than real. The number of minor parties and independent politicians did continue to decline during the 1950's, but the two major parties themselves failed to achieve lasting unity. The LP collapsed when Rhee lost power in 1960. In the ensuing elections the Democrats won control of the government, but the party soon fell prey to factional feuding over the division of spoils and split into two competing groups. A number of minor parties also reemerged, including several that were leftist oriented. After the military coup in 1961, parties were banned until January 1963, when the military government permitted political activity to resume preparatory to the reestablishment of civilian government.

One of the principal objectives of the new government was to develop a true two-party system. Stringent constitutional and legal requisites were set for political parties. To prevent the multiplication of minor parties and splinter groups, National Assemblymen were discouraged from switching party allegiance or becoming independents, on pain of losing their Assembly seat. Another rule designed to promote party discipline specified that a candidate for the National Assembly had to be a party member. Although these regulations had the desired effect of reducing the number of parties—by 1969 only nine were registered with the government, and of these only two were actively involved in political competition—party politics continued to focus on narrow partisan concerns rather than on national issues.

A new Political Party Law, enacted on 29 December 1972, reversed the government's policy of encouraging the growth of strong parties. In an effort to further reduce the political role of the Assembly and the civilian politicians, the legal requirements for establishing a political party have been substantially relaxed. To qualify as a party, a group now must have local chapters—with a minimum of 50 members each—in only one-third of the country's 73 election districts. The old law required a party to have at least 100 members each in over half of the 131 election districts. The new law also abolishes the rule depriving a legislator of his seat in the Assembly if he leaves his party. The greatest blow to the parties' role in the political process, however, is the new constitutional provision giving Pak the power, through the institution of the Constitutional Committee, to dissolve any party at will.

(1) *Democratic Republican Party (DRP)*—Of South Korea's two major parties, President Pak's DRP most resembles a modern political organization. The DRP was organized in late 1962 by Pak's long-time political confidant Kim Chong-p'il as a means of perpetuating the regime's power following the reestablishment of constitutional government. Political workers were recruited from all over the nation, and a party secretariat with paid employees was formed to carry on day-to-day administrative functions. Local branches were established in each election district, supported by a variety of auxiliary organizations designed to attract the support of women, youth, and other special interest groups.

Although it has made some effort to appeal to public sentiment, the DRP derives its cohesion in large part from its effective organization. With an absence of motivating ideas or ideals, the membership is held together primarily by hope for a slice of the spoils: graft, government employment, or business advantage. The lifeblood of the DRP remains the funds which are channeled to the party from government sources and kickbacks paid by business and industry in exchange for government guarantees and other special favors.

As conceived by its founders, the party was to have responsibility for formulating national policy, and its members were to serve as a cutting edge for the new government's national development program. The DRP never achieved these goals. It quickly fell prey to the same debilitating internal factional strife that helped destroy Rhee's autocratic regime and virtually paralyzed the succeeding democratic administration of Chang Myon. To fill its ranks, the new party took in diverse and sometimes politically incompatible

elements, including former military officers and intelligence agents, out-of-work rejects from Rhee's administration, and intellectuals pressed into service to act as idea men for the regime. The ensuing struggle between these often hostile groups for control of the DRP's governing machinery divided the regime and threatened to bring down the government.

Disenchanted with the actions of his DRP supporters, Pak has used each new crisis to reduce the role of the party, relying in its stead on the government bureaucracy and the state security apparatus to maintain political control. Finally, with the government reorganization of 1972-73 he reduced the DRP to little more than a sinecure for loyal supporters charged with carrying out regime policies in a tamed National Assembly. Even in this area, however, the party's mandate appears to have become less than clear cut. Following the February 1973 elections the regime announced that the 73 National Assemblymen confirmed by the National Conference for Unification upon the recommendation of the President would not join the DRP. Instead, they are to become an independent parliamentary negotiating group within the National Assembly called the "Revitalizing Reforms Political Fraternity" (*Yushin Chongahoe*), generally referred to as the Revitalization Group. Pak's ability to bring the DRP to heel has in large measure depended upon the tacit support of the military, who, like Pak, believe the nation can ill afford the luxury of partisan politics.

(2) *New Democratic Party* (*NDP*)—The NDP, South Korea's only other major political party, was founded in 1967 from a coalition of conservative political groups that had earlier opposed President Rhee and had inherited control of the government for a brief period following his ouster in 1960. The leaders of the NDP constitute most of the civilian politicians who oppose the DRP and President Pak. Their differences with the regime are not so much over policy as over the issue of presidential power. They have vigorously but ineffectively fought Pak's measures to expand the powers of the presidency at the expense of the other branches of the government and have consistently advocated a stronger National Assembly and more open and democratic government.

The NDP receives its greatest backing from reform-minded urban elements—students, intellectuals, and some members of the new middle class—which are critical of government corruption and authoritarianism. The party also has had some support from urban workers and in regions of the country that usually have tended to be antagonistic to whatever government is in power. The sum of this support, however, has never been great enough to overcome the panoply of financial and bureaucratic resources available to the government at election time. Consequently, the NDP's chances of gaining control of the government are not good. Kim Tae-chong, the NDP's dynamic young candidate in the 1971 presidential race, the last that was popularly contested, came closest to challenging Pak's control. Kim polled 43.3% of the vote compared to 51.1% for Pak. In the National Assembly elections the same year, the Democrats won 85 of the 204 seats. When elections for the Assembly were held in February 1973 under the new rules established by Pak, however, the NDP got only 52 of 219 seats in the reorganized Assembly, and fewer than one-third of the 146 seats filled by direct popular vote.

The NDP, like the DRP, has been plagued by intense factional disputes, and power within the party is divided among often bitterly competitive faction chiefs. In the absence of unity, party policy has been subordinated to struggles over patronage and the standing of individuals within the party. It is not uncommon at election time for candidates of one faction to accept the secret backing of the government in return for their undercutting the candidacy of rivals particularly abhorrent to the regime. For example, Kim Tae-chung did not have the full support of the party in 1971; other influential NDP leaders were concerned that if Kim made a very strong showing, their own standing within the party would be diminished.

In the 1973 National Assembly elections, an NDP splinter group led by Yang Il-tong, a senior faction chief, broke from the party to run its own candidates. Calling itself the Democratic Unification Party (*Minchu Tongil Dang*) the group elected only two assemblymen but cut significantly into the NDP's normally strong support in urban areas, with the result that progovernment candidates won in those areas.

Such actions over the years have contributed to an erosion of public confidence in the NDP as a viable alternative to Pak's government. Of those who continue to vote for the NDP, many appear to do so largely as a gesture of protest but would have strong second thoughts about substituting its discordant leadership for Pak's proven capabilities as a national leader.

Since the 1972-73 government reorganization, the NDP's ability to maintain even a semblance of independence has become highly doubtful. Under the new system of expanded presidential powers Pak undoubtedly intends for the New Democrats to serve only as a token opposition in order to preserve the appearance of representative processes. This role is not

abhorrent to many New Democratic assemblymen however; party chairman Yu Chin-san and his supporters, for example, are generally thought to be responsive to government manipulation. The material rewards can be substantial for opposition assemblymen willing to cooperate with the regime, as they are then in a position to enjoy influence and other prerogatives of public office, and especially the opportunity for personal aggrandizement that is present in a society where almost every public service has a price.

The national convention is theoretically the supreme policymaking organ of the NDP, but in practice the central standing committee, which is made up of the various faction chiefs and their lieutenants, is the real decisionmaking body. The degree of control and influence exercised by the party chairman depends largely on his personal following within the party. A powerful faction leader like Yu Chin-san, who became party chairman in the spring of 1973, is able to exercise much greater control over party affairs than did his predecessor Kim Hong-il. Kim, a compromise choice for the job, had been picked by the party bosses precisely because he lacked an independent power base.

At the local level, the NDP, like the DRP, has a chapter in each election district, but because of the sparsity of funds available to the opposition many chapters exist in name only between elections. The NDP has depended on donations from wealthy supporters, membership fees from the party's assemblymen, and money raised by its local chapters. Many of these sources have been cut off or substantially reduced by Pak's security apparatus through intimidation and other means, and the party is becoming increasingly dependent on money allotted it through *sub rosa* channels by the regime.

(3) *Minor parties*—President Pak's reorganization of the political system has made the outlook uncertain for a number of splinter groups that legally qualify as parties but lack true national standing. These range from the conservative Liberal Party—a remnant of Rhee's once-powerful organization—to the mildly leftist Masses Party. The newest of the group is the Democratic Unification Party (DUP), which split off from the NDP to contest the 1973 Assembly elections as an independent party. Some groups, like the DUP, may be encouraged by the regime to become more active as a result of Pak's desire to undercut the influence of the major parties. Others may vanish completely, if for no other reason than the age of their leaders.

The minor parties, like the two major ones, are predominantly conservative. Their membership consists largely of unsuccessful politicians who for one reason or another have failed to make it into either the DRP or the NDP. Some of these parties and their leaders have the support of the regime, which tries to split the opposition vote at election time. For this reason they are frequently maligned by the NDP and have next to no public support. The DUP, the only minor party that took part in the 1973 Assembly elections, received just over 10% of the popular vote (and two seats), compared to about 7% received by the two minor parties that participated in the 1971 elections.

Before the 1961 military coup there were several minor leftwing parties, but only the Progressive Party, led by ex-Communist Cho Pong-am, attracted enough popular support to offer any real alternative to the ruling conservatives. The Progressive Party championed a kind of "democratic socialism," while rejecting both communism and capitalism; it also proposed peaceful unification of North and South Korea. During 1957 the Progressive Party appeared to be gaining considerable support, particularly among students and urban intellectuals, but in early 1958 Cho and several other party leaders were arrested and charged with violation of the National Security Act. The party's registration was canceled, and Cho was executed at the order of President Rhee.

Following the 1961 military coup, the leftwing parties were broken up, and most of their leaders were jailed. After the reestablishment of civilian government in late 1963, those adherents who had escaped imprisonment or had been released resumed political activities. The two most durable of the leftist groups are So Min-ho's Masses Party (Taechung Dang) and Kim Ch'ol's United Socialist Party (*Tongsa Dang*).

3. Interest groups

Organized pressure groups have played a relatively unimportant role in South Korean politics. Labor unions and business associations are plentiful but are primarily concerned with winning influence or government favor, and are often directly or indirectly controlled by the government. For example, the bulk of union membership is controlled by the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), whose officers support the regime and are under its direction. The network of agricultural cooperatives and associations of the farmers and fishermen are government operated. The various veterans' groups, including the massive Korean Veterans Association, are all subject to

some degree of government domination. Many such organizations receive some budgetary support from the regime, and they are often manipulated for political purposes; none has played a major role in political life.

The students are the major exception to the usual pattern of government domination. With a proud tradition of opposition to Japanese rule, and partly as a result of the tradition of respect for the educated person, South Korean students tend to see themselves as the nation's political conscience. Students demonstrated their power in 1960 when spontaneous demonstrations by thousands of high school and college youths sparked the ouster of the faltering Rhee regime. Volatile, and often subject to diverse political manipulation, the students have been a source of concern and irritation to each succeeding government.

The concentration of some 35 colleges and other institutions of higher learning in Seoul makes the capital a political powder keg. A few of these schools are operated by the government, and all are subject to some degree of official control, but almost all have a tradition of political opposition and criticism—the prestigious Seoul National University being a case in point. The student bodies of the elite private universities in Seoul—Korea, Yonse (Yonsei), Sogang, and Ewha (the last a women's institution)—also take a keen interest in national affairs. Although there is no all-embracing Korean student organization, there is communication and liaison between groups on the different campuses.

The professors and intellectuals, hardly less critical of government than the students, make up another loose pressure group. Their influence and sentiments extend to students, newspaper readers, and radio audiences. The formally organized educational associations, however, have for the most part been discreet and have avoided involvement in politics.

From time to time the government has suspected that different religious groups have been involved in politics. Buddhist efforts to influence the government have been limited to seeking preference in the settlement of property disputes. The Christians are a more politically potent force, but so far any political action associated with the churches has largely been conducted by the leaders as individuals—not by the membership of church groups as a whole.

4. Electoral laws and practices

The South Koreans have a high rate of voter participation in elections. In the first general elections after independence, 80% of those eligible registered, and 90% of those who registered voted. Although the voting rate has decreased somewhat in more recent elections, it has continued to be generally high. Voter participation in the 1971 presidential election—the last one in which the President was popularly elected—was almost 80%. The large turnout of voters, 91.6%, for the 1972 national referendum changing the constitution to give the President virtually unlimited powers was only partially the result of government pressure to demonstrate popular support for the amendment. Voting rates in the countryside are generally higher than those in the cities, and rural voters are more likely to support the group in power.

In the 1973 National Assembly elections—held under new rules established following the 1972 revision of the constitution—72.9% of 15,690,130 eligible voters cast ballots, compared to 72.8% in the 1971 Assembly elections. Local voting rates in 1973 also tended to follow the 1971 pattern. In Seoul, where political interest runs high but the government's ability to get out the vote is limited, the rate was 62%, the same as in 1971. The greatest change occurred at Pusan, the nation's second largest city, where the rate was 70.3% down almost 2% from 1971. In the rural areas the 1973 voting rate also tended to adhere to established patterns. Kangwon-do,[2] where the large military vote is easily managed by the government, had the highest rate of voter participation—80.7%; the lowest was Kyonggi-do, where 74.4% voted.

Under the revised constitution all citizens 20 years of age and older have the right to vote for public officials and to hold public office in accordance with the law. Certain persons can be disenfranchised, however, by reason of criminal conviction or by court ruling.

The system for electing the 219-member National Assembly is designed to assure government control over the conduct and outcome of the elections. The National Assembly Law of December 1972 provides for 73 electoral districts, with two assemblymen from each district. The winners are the two candidates in each district who have polled the largest number of votes. In case there are only two candidates, they are automatically the winners and there is no voting. The remaining 73 members of the Assembly are elected by the National Conference for Unification from a list submitted by the President. Thus the government, by running only one candidate in each election district (something that is more difficult for the less disciplined opposition to do) is practically assured of winning as much as a two-thirds majority.

[2] For discrities on place names, see the list of names on the apron of the Summary Map in the Country Profile chapter and the map itself.

Other provisions of the law provide that independents as well as political party members are eligible to run for the Assembly. However, all candidates are required to deposit a fee with their local election management committee, amounting to 2 million *won* (about $5,000) for a party candidate and 3 million *won* (about $7,500) for an independent candidate. The fee, minus the candidate's campaign expenses, is returnable after the election unless the candidate receives less than one third of the valid votes cast in his district or unless he for any reason drops out or is expelled from the race. All government officials, except cabinet ministers, who desire to become candidates must resign within 5 days after the announcement of the election.

The new law also lays down strict government controls over electoral practices. The campaign period is set at 18 days, and individual campaigning by candidates is prohibited. Instead, government-controlled local election committees are given the responsibility of organizing joint speech rallies in their respective election districts. These may not exceed three per county or two per city or city ward. Candidates may speak at the rallies for a maximum of 30 minutes, and are prohibited from commenting about public figures, including all public officials, their family members, and other candidates. The traditional distribution of small gifts—socks, towels, soap, rice wine—is prohibited.

The provisions of the November 1972 law for electing members of the National Conference for Unification are even more restrictive than those relating to elections to the National Assembly. Election is by direct popular vote. Candidates must be at least 30 years old, have lived in their districts a minimum of 2 years, and have obtained the signatures of 300 voters, or fewer if the population of the district is less than 5,000. They may not belong to a political party or have held any other public office, or have served on active military duty, for at least 60 days prior to the end of the term of the incumbent Conference. Campaigning is limited to a single 20-minute speech at one joint campaign meeting organized by the local election management committee. The speech may cover only the candidate's academic and professional background, his reasons for running, and his views on Korean unification. No provision is made for nominating candidates, but local officials seek out and push the candidacy of persons acceptable to the regime. Candidates are required to register with their local election management committee within 5 days of the President's announcement of the election date.

In the 1973 National Assembly elections, the new electoral system worked to the government's advantage as intended. Although the share of the popular vote won by regime candidates remained virtually unchanged from 1971, the government's share of the Assembly's seats increased to over two-thirds: 73 DRP candidates who won district seats, 73 other assemblymen indirectly appointed by President Pak by means of the NCU mechanism, and many of the 19 independents elected. The most striking change from 1971, however, was the seven district seats picked up by the DRP in Seoul and the party's gains in other urban areas previously held by the opposition. This occurred despite a decline in the DRP's share of the popular vote in Seoul from 40% in 1971 to 33% in 1973. The DRP's gain in urban areas was largely the result of the party's decision to limit the number of its candidates in order to take advantage of the new system of two-man districts wherein each voter has a single vote. Figure 4 depicts the composition of the National Assembly following the 1973 elections.

In presidential elections the new system virtually assures the reelection of the incumbent if he chooses to run. The NCU not only nominates but also elects the President. Theoretically the NCU members are free to nominate whomever they choose and then vote for the candidate of their choice, but the important role played by the government in the selection of conference members has a compelling influence on the way they are likely to vote. In the first presidential election under the new system in 1972, President Pak was the only candidate nominated and he received every vote but for two which were declared invalid by the election officials.



FIGURE 4. Composition of National Assembly, June 1973 (U/OU)

Election day for members of both the National Assembly and the NCU is set by the President and must be announced not later than 18 days before the elections. Polling places are established in each city ward and each county seat and township. Ward, county, and township heads prepare lists of voters who live in their respective territories. Polls open at 7 a.m. and close at 5 p.m. Ballots are counted only at the ward, city, and county offices.

General elections (including national referendums) are conducted and paid for by the Central Election Management Committee (CEMC) and its subordinate committees in each election district. The CEMC is responsible for establishing election guidelines for the whole country; local committees are responsible for regulating the campaign activities of the candidates in their district, including setting campaign costs. These are determined on the basis of prevailing local conditions—for example, current wages, size of the election district, transportation needs—and are paid for largely out of the funds that the candidates are required to deposit with the election committee.

The ostensible purpose of the CEMC, a constitutional body, is to insure free and honest elections. To guarantee impartiality, members are barred from joining parties or participating in any political activities, and they are paid only for their official expenses. Despite these provisions, the CEMC is in fact an extension of presidential authority over the electoral process. The President appoints its nine members, including three each from among nominees submitted to him by the National Assembly and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. He also appoints the chairman of the committee. Committeemen are appointed for a term of 5 years which may be renewed, and they may be removed only through impeachment or criminal conviction.

South Korean elections have generally been dishonest. The Rhee regime in its final years relied increasingly on the crudest forms of fraudulent balloting and physical intimidation. After the 1960 revolution, elections were essentially free, although conspicuous for the subtler forms of intimidation and bribery. The government reforms of 1972-73, of which tighter election controls are but a part, have eliminated many of the remaining abuses while reducing the election process to a *pro forma* exercise controlled by the government. Both the December 1972 and February 1973 National Assembly elections were in fact notable for their low cost and their relative freedom from corrupt practices.

D. National policies (S)

1. Domestic

The major domestic policy objectives of the Pak Chong-hui government have been to make the Republic of Korea politically and economically viable. Policies to achieve these aims have concentrated on creating an environment favorable for self-generating economic growth—with attendant improvement in living standards of the people—and on strengthening the nation's military and internal defenses to cope with the threat of North Korean aggression. The leadership's initial intolerance of democratic methods eased considerably during the mid-1960's as a result of the dramatic success of its foreign and economic policies. Subsequent shifting great-power relationships in Asia and growing political uncertainties at home, however, have led Pak to return to a more authoritarian style of government.

At a time when the regime perceives the nation's interests to be threatened by external developments over which it has no control, the goal of maintaining internal political stability assumes increased urgency. The constitutional changes adopted by the 21 November 1972 national referendum have legitimized the tight restrictions placed on civil and political rights in December 1971 when Pak declared a state of national emergency. Although most informed South Koreans probably regret the curtailment of democratic process and the loss of personal freedom, a great many seem to agree with Pak that the perils inherent in Seoul's growing dialog with the Communist North warrant the tightening of domestic controls. The relatively low level of opposition voiced by the nation's traditional proponents of more open government—the students, intellectuals, and Christians—is in part attributable to the pervasiveness of Pak's security apparatus. Nevertheless, there appears to be a general tendency to accept the tighter controls, provided they are applied with restraint and the national economy is not adversely affected.

As part of its emphasis on nationbuilding, the government has sought to establish a new national consensus based on the spartan values of patriotism, hard work, and self-denial. At the heart of this program is the New Community Movement (*Saemaul Undong*). Originally designed to promote rural development, the movement's scope in recent years has been broadened to include the whole society. Today in the urban areas it encompasses the high schools and universities, church groups, and organized labor. The movement has come in for considerable

criticism that it is little more than another political device being used by the President to enhance his political control. Nonetheless, the program's nationalistic, collectivist, and constructive aspects seem to have struck a genuine response among many Koreans—including students and intellectuals who are among the most cynical of Pak's critics.

Bound up with Pak's policy of national regeneration has been an insistence on maintaining a high level of law and order. The regime has tried—with varying degrees of success—to give substance to his ideal of public morality by periodically rounding up petty criminals and prostitutes, rigorously enforcing traffic regulations, and cracking down on smuggling and blackmarket operations. Most significantly, the regime has sought to damp down corruption in government and business. At various times widespread anticorruption drives have been undertaken which have usually resulted in the discharge or arrest of large numbers of petty officials, some middle-level executives, and an occasional nabob who has fallen out of favor. The regime's efforts have seldom, however, reached into the ranks of the military-government elite, many of whom are deeply involved in corruption and graft. Nevertheless, these campaigns have served to hold down the more outrageous forms of official extortion and blackmail with which the common citizen has to contend.

President Pak has made a firm and unequivocal effort to preserve internal security. Anticommunism was among the first of his "revolutionary pledges" when his group seized power in 1961, and it has remained a major preoccupation ever since. Although Pak probably was deeply involved with the Communists during 1946-48, and some of his early associates were suspected of having Communist sympathies, the regime has followed a policy of ferreting out and suppressing all Communist activity. This has taken on an even greater urgency since the start of talks with the North in August 1971 because of South Korean fears that the North Koreans will attempt to use any lowering of barriers to subvert the South. While exceptions have been made to the legal prohibitions against contacts with the North in order to facilitate the carrying on of negotiations, internal security controls have in fact been tightened. The Korean Labor (Communist) Party remains outlawed, and there are stringent penalties against subversion, espionage, and sabotage.

Another major goal, and one of the most popular, has been the creation of a welfare state. A modest social welfare program has been developed, farmers and fishermen have been granted government loans to liquidate their usurious debts, and a workmen's compensation law has been enacted. None of these measures has proved completely successful, however, because of the lack of adequate financial resources.

The government accords economic development a high priority and is undertaking industrial modernization and trade liberalization on the basis of four 5-year plans covering the period 1962-81, including the current Third Five Year Plan that ends in 1976. The first plan concentrated on strengthening the coal and electrical industries, transportation, telecommunications, and selected industries such as oil, cement, and steel whose improvement would result in import savings, and agriculture and fisheries. These goals were largely achieved, despite a monetary stabilization program that temporarily slowed down economic growth. The Second Five Year Plan called for a number of multipurpose dams, development of the iron and petrochemical industries, a national land development program, a long-term electric power resources development program, and an increase in food production under a 7-year agriculture and forestry program that began in 1965. The goals of the Second Five Year Plan also were achieved, and some were overfulfilled. Faced with a slowdown in economic growth in the early 1970's, the Third Five Year Plan sets more modest goals, but the considerable improvement in the agricultural sector and the continued industrial development envisaged in the plan appear to be achievable.

The government's determination to promote exports is an important element in economic policy. This in turn has led to the adoption of a floating exchange rate certificate system, a trade liberalization program, and a reformation of the credit structure, while containing prices and limiting speculation.

Despite the existence of an extensive private sector, the government is the decisive influence in the economy; with greatest control exercised through complete ownership or majority positions in financial institutions. The government also owns utilities and many enterprises producing basic goods. In many cases the ownership is turned over to private interests when an industry is well established. Foreign investment is encouraged by tax concessions, unrestricted equity participation, repatriation of profits, and monetary stability.

At first the overall performance of the economy was uneven, but since 1963 the rate of growth has been impressive not only in industrial production but also in GNP, exports, and imports.

2. Foreign

The ultimate objective of the government's foreign policy is the achievement of a united Korea under Seoul's control, secure from any threat of seizure or domination by its larger neighbors to the north or Japan to the east. In pursuit of this general objective, South Korean governments have for over two decades maintained a strong anti-Communist posture, supported the U.N. formula for Korean unification, sought admission to the United Nations, placed a premium on close and friendly ties with the United States, contributed a large military contingent to the anti-Communist effort in South Vietnam, and demanded treatment as an equal by Japan. The broad outlines of this foreign policy have been accepted by most South Koreans, regardless of domestic political differences.

The hostility that has existed between South and North Korea throughout the postwar era has been the central factor in shaping Seoul's foreign relations. Fear of North Korean aggression has been the major reason for Seoul to maintain a large defense establishment, with more than 600,000 men under arms, and for virtually all of the anti-Communist and antisubversion laws on the books. All contacts by private citizens with North Koreans are forbidden; there has been no direct movement of mail, commerce, or persons between the two halves of the country. Until recently, communications have been limited almost exclusively to the orchestration of rival propaganda campaigns asserting their respective claims to be the rightful government of all Korea while denigrating the legitimacy of the other. Internationally, the two have engaged in an endless battle of one-upmanship for international recognition, a competition in which Seoul's lead is steadily narrowing.

These policies are now undergoing considerable modification as both Seoul and P'yongyang respond to the developing detente in East-West relations. In August 1971, Seoul proposed talks between the Red Cross organizations of the two countries for the purpose of bringing together families that had been separated by the Korean war. P'yongyang promptly accepted. The subsequent meetings provided an opportunity for confidential discussions that led to the establishment in July 1972 of a high-level joint committee to work for the reunification of Korea.

The willingness to enter a dialog has not come easily for either Seoul or P'yongyang, and it is unlikely that either foresees any possibility of meaningful progress toward unification except in such relatively uncontroversial areas as humanitarian, cultural, and economic cooperation. Nonetheless, both sides probably believe they have a vested interest in perpetuating the dialog as a means of furthering political objectives that are fundamentally competitive and incompatible.

President Pak recognizes that the North Koreans, after 20 years of failure to make any appreciable dent in Seoul's political armor by violent means, are interested in using the dialog primarily as an alternate avenue for achieving a united Korea under Communist rule. Pak believes, however, that it is of greater concern that Seoul involve P'yongyang in a web of relationships that will serve as a deterrent to renewed North Korean aggression against the South once the Americans have left Korea. Events in recent years—the Nixon Doctrine, the Sino-U.S. detente, and Peking's entry into the United Nations—have convinced Pak and many other Koreans that Seoul cannot indefinitely continue to count on the United States for its security and the defense of its other interests. Furthermore, all Koreans north and south are acutely aware of their country's tragic history of subordination to larger and more powerful neighbors, and it is likely that both Seoul and P'yongyang have come to see a direct line of communication as one way of forestalling any great-power effort to dictate Korea's future.

While the South Koreans now foresee the day when U.S. forces in Korea will be withdrawn, the maintenance of close friendly relations with Washington continues to be the keystone of South Korea's foreign policy (Figure 5). Since the division of the Korean Peninsula at the close of World War II, Seoul has relied heavily on the United States for military security and economic assistance. U.S. economic aid is being gradually phased out as the Korean economy becomes stronger, but access to American markets and investment capital remains vital to the nation's continued economic growth. South Korean policymakers also see no acceptable alternative to continued reliance on the United States for the military aid which the South must have to maintain military parity with the North. The basic U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea is contained in the Mutual Defense Treaty, which became effective on 17 November 1954. Other bilateral agreements include the Status of Forces Agreement signed on 9 July 1966; the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation signed 28 November 1956; and arrangements for the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

The decision of the ROK Government to dispatch a force of some 50,000 Koreans to Vietnam was

FIGURE 5. Pak Chong-hui and wife visit President and Mrs. Nixon in California in 1969 (U/OU)

supported by a large majority of South Koreans. They believed this action would both strengthen the U.S. commitment to South Korea and provide an opportunity to benefit economically from the war. The last of these forces had returned to South Korea by March 1973 after over 7 years' service in South Vietnam (Figure 6).

The emergence of Japan in recent years as one of the foremost economic powers in the world has led Seoul to accord high priority to normalizing relations with Tokyo. The establishment of full diplomatic relations in 1965 opened the way for massive injections of Japanese economic aid. Moreover, in the view of some South Korean planners the Japanese economy has reached a point of development that will enable South Korea to take over the role of Japan's declining, small-scale consumer goods industries, with Japan supplying South Korea the necessary capital investment and plants. A continuing point of contention is the imbalance in trade between the two countries, which Seoul is trying to correct by urging Japan to relax restrictions that limit the market for South Korean products.

FIGURE 6. ROK troops leave South Vietnam (U/OU)

While welcoming the large development funds and know-how Japan has provided, Koreans still fear Japan might somehow try to reestablish its hegemony over their nation. Japanese investment and business ties are monitored, and Japanese businessmen have been subjected to onerous taxes. The government is particularly concerned over Japan's relationship with North Korea. Although Seoul is pleased that Tokyo does not recognize P'yongyang, Japanese sanction of a program under which about 100,000 Korean residents in Japan have been repatriated to North Korea since 1959 has aroused resentment and opposition in South Korea. Moreover, Japan's small but expanding trade with North Korea, although only 5% as large as its trade with South Korea during 1971, irks Seoul. The government also deplores the fact that Japan accords what is deemed second-class treatment to some 600,000 Koreans in Japan, and that it allows the P'yongyang-sponsored *Chosen Soren* (General Federation of Koreans Resident in Japan) to operate freely among Koreans.

The European powers do not loom as important elements in South Korea's foreign relations, except for the investment, trade, technical assistance, and

welfare activities that these nations support. West Germany has been a principal investor among the European countries. In addition the South Koreans have taken a special pride in having friendly relations with the West Germans—with whom they tend to identify as another divided people—as a symbol of South Korea's coming of age internationally.

Seoul has in the past eschewed relations with Communist countries. Heretofore, the South also refused to maintain diplomatic relations with governments that recognize the North Korean regime, although exceptions were made for consular relations when the advantages seemed overriding.

Seoul's attitude has grown considerably more flexible, however, reflecting the changing political situation in East Asia. In a major foreign policy statement in June 1973, President Pak formally opened the door to relations with all countries, calling in particular for Communist nations to reciprocate. Seoul's leaders are now eager to establish diplomatic as well as economic and cultural relations with governments that recognize P'yongyang. Toward this end, Seoul is also seeking privately to establish a political dialog with both Moscow and Peking, and is seeking the support of its allies in initiating contacts.

As part of this change in foreign policy, South Korea has given up its objection to a U.N. debate on the Korean issue, and has indicated its willingness to have P'yongyang attend such a debate. Even more important, Seoul has recommended that both Koreas be admitted to the United Nations under terms compatible with eventual reunification. Implicit in all this is a *de facto* recognition of North Korea, but Seoul government spokesmen have ruled out any diplomatic recognition of the North.

South Korean membership in the United Nations has up to now been barred by the vetoes of Communist members as well as others who object to U.N. entry for divided nations. However, the South Korean Government has been invited to participate in the annual U.N. debate on Korea, has a permanent observer in New York, and is a member of most U.N. specialized agencies. Seoul also belongs to many other international groups, including the Colombo Plan, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

E. Threats to government stability

1. Discontent and dissidence (C)

Sociological and historical factors that have influenced the development of Korea have produced an exceptionally homogeneous people, but one with a strong proclivity for dissension and intrigue. Long historical continuity, decades of isolation as the "Hermit Kingdom," and a confining peninsular geography have welded the Koreans into a tight mold of one race, language, and culture. Thus Korea has largely escaped the racial, linguistic, and religious conflicts that frequently afflict more diverse societies. In South Korea a Confucian network of close family ties still provides the basis for a degree of social stability, despite the great changes in society during recent decades. This rigid structure of traditional society, however, has also channeled the Koreans' national volatility into behavior patterns that are expressed not only by outbursts of anger, rebelliousness, and cruelty but also by violent opposition to those in power.

Political stability is affected in other ways by the country's Confucian heritage. The concept of a loyal opposition is difficult for Koreans to accept, given the traditional view of society as an extended family ruled over by a benevolent patriarch. This is a decided disadvantage in a nation undergoing the stresses of social, political, and economic change. National issues tend to be resolved by tests of force rather than on their merits. The government attempts to suppress its critics, often using police-state tactics, and the critics, in turn, frequently resort to violence in trying to pull down those who are in authority. The Confucian emphasis on family ties rather than broader community interests encourages factionalism and corruption. Political alignments tend to be formed on the basis of family, regional, or even school ties for purposes of expediency and personal enrichment rather than on shared concern for national interests or loyalty to a common set of principles.

During periods of strong national leadership, the centrifugal forces at work in Korean politics tend to be held in check by government repression and intimidation. When a government is weak or a regime is on the decline, these forces eventually lead to political indecision and collapse. In either case the prudent Korean learns to be distrustful of all government. In modern times this distrust has been nurtured first by the participants in the international power struggle over Korea which began late in the 19th century, and later through the struggle for independence against the Japanese. It continued in South Korea after the liberation from Japan in 1945 and the hostilities with North Korea and China during 1950-53, and to a lesser extent up to the present as Koreans continue to wrestle with the exigencies and uncertainties of existence in a rapidly changing and still essentially poor society.

The tensions produced by change in South Korea do not stem from resentment toward an old entrenched aristocracy, because Korea's *ancien regime* was largely destroyed by 40 years of Japanese rule, land reform beginning in the late 1940's, and devastation and dislocation resulting from the Korean war. Rather the country's social and political problems are those of a people in a transitional society, who share a feeling of common identity but have not found their future path. In South Korea the search is made more difficult by a large population, a sparsity of economic resources, national partition, and, more recently, the uncertainties of changing international relationships in East Asia.

Much of the instability inherent in Korean society has been curbed under President Pak's strong leadership. Public order has been strengthened and the strictures on political dissent tightened in the name of national unity. Most significantly, the considerable success of the government's policies, particularly its economic programs, has won Pak the support, or at least the acquiescence, of a large majority of the people, including a very broad spectrum of the political, military, bureaucratic, and economic elite.

The very success of Pak's policies, however, is creating new problems and broadening the dimensions of old ones—all of which could undermine the stability of his government. Rapid industrialization has produced urban blight on an unprecedented scale. Seoul now ranks in the forefront of the world's most polluted cities. Housing and social services lag far behind the needs of the nation's burgeoning urban population. The benefits of the new prosperity are being unevenly distributed, widening the gap between rich and poor, city and countryside. Unemployment and inflation, although still at manageable proportions, remain a real and constant threat to the livelihood of most South Koreans. The public has also become less tolerant of corruption and venality in high places, which perhaps is greater and better organized than at any time in Korea's history.

Pak has responded to these pressures by tightening his control. He has rewritten the constitution to give himself broad dictatorial powers, and a pervasive intelligence and security apparatus reaches into virtually every aspect of national life. To win the public's support for the curtailment of political and civil liberties, his regime has emphasized the dangers the nation faces in coping with the emerging detente in East Asia, including the dialog currently underway with the Communist North. Loyalty to the nation and the government is also fostered through special cultural and sports events, the celebration of national holidays, and the publicizing of dedication ceremonies for new industrial plants, dams, and similar projects.

Most South Koreans appear to agree with Pak that times are perilous and that stringent internal controls are warranted. Moreover, few Koreans probably would be willing to risk exchanging the security and economic progress provided by Pak's administration for the uncertainties of an untested leader. Nevertheless, by employing strong measures which affect wide segments of the society, Pak runs the risk of nurturing those very forces of dissension he is seeking to hold in check. A particularly difficult situation could arise if the nation were to suffer a sharp setback, such as a serious downturn in the economy, shaking public confidence in the regime and setting off a spiral of public protests and heavyhanded government repression.

The greatest potential threat is the military, the ultimate arbiter of South Korean political power. Pak, former general, has had the almost united support of the armed forces, in part because of the apparent lack of a feasible alternative to his continued leadership. Moreover, Pak has been careful to look out for the interests of the military and to select key commanders who are personally loyal to him. If Pak's leadership begins to falter and his policies turn sour, however, latent tensions within the officer corps would be likely to grow and any of several groups might become sufficiently disgruntled to seek his ouster.

Time and attrition have greatly reduced the rabid factionalism—based on provincial origin and prior service in the Chinese Nationalist and Japanese armed forces—that characterized the South Korean military's early years. Differences between officer groups continue, however. Alleged favoritism on behalf of officers from the Kyongsang provinces, Pak's home region, is a continuing source of resentment. Those army officers who have graduated from the Korean Military Academy since 1953 are set off from members of earlier graduating classes by higher qualifications for selection and the fact that they had 4 years at the academy. They tend to view themselves as an elite group and look down on their seniors, whom they regard as corrupt and less competent. Other potential causes of unrest include the slower rate of promotion in peacetime, the possibility of reduced U.S. military assistance, the opportunity for corruption among senior officers, and unease over the regime's dialog with the North.

In the event of a massive demonstration of public opposition to the regime, it is uncertain to what extent the military would be willing to apply force to save Pak. Although the army has repeatedly demonstrated

a willingness to crack the heads of student protesters critical of the government, it has shunned actions likely to produce bloodletting on a large scale. The military proved unwilling to fire on the students in 1960 to save the regime of Syngman Rhee, and it is a moot point whether under similar circumstances it would be willing to do so to save Pak.

Korean students have a tradition of political activism dating back to the struggle to gain independence from Japan. Strikes were frequently staged by college and high school students to protest Japanese rule. In addition, the great respect for the educated person has encouraged students to regard themselves as the guardians of national values and the defenders of liberalism against dictatorship. The students' role in the overthrow of Rhee strengthened their self-image as the "conscience of the nation" and gave it new impetus.

Not all student activism is spontaneous or idealistically motivated. Korean students are just as prone to corruption and factionalism as their elders; they have never had a nationwide student organization. Thus they have been highly vulnerable to manipulation by both government and opposition politicians, often for short-run personal gain. To keep the students in line, the government over the years has evolved a formula made up of approximately equal parts of bribery, surveillance, and judicious use of force and intimidation. The more intransigent student leaders, for example, are frequently singled out for early induction into the armed forces. Such measures have become quite effective over the years and has lessened the threat of large-scale student demonstrations.

Students have not been completely cowed, however, and their activities are a continuing source of concern to the regime. The "big three" universities—Seoul National, Korea, and Yonse—are particularly well known for their student activists. A highly energetic and vocal minority at Seoul National University's Liberal Arts and Sciences, Law, and Commerce colleges has made these schools centers of nationalist and left-wing sentiment. Similar groups of young instructors and students exist on most of the other campuses. They not only are targets for Communist subversion but also are susceptible to extremist appeals of any group seeking to overthrow the government.

Other disgruntled groups include assorted professional people, out-of-power politicians, and the intellectuals—university professors and other educators, lawyers, journalists, and small businessmen. The owners of large business enterprises have long since reached an accommodation with the Pak regime, as they did with previous governments.

Perhaps the most disaffected of these groups are the opposition politicians, who see the revision of the constitution in 1972 as a device aimed at perpetuating Pak's rule indefinitely and restricting their normal opportunities. As of early 1973, however, none of these men either individually or collectively appeared to be in a position to overthrow the regime. Almost all of them have been tainted to some extent by the opposition's reputation for being politically ineffective. Others are discredited because they are believed to be secretly in the pay of the regime. A few like Kim Tae-chung, the leading opposition candidate in the 1971 presidential race, are genuinely popular but lack the military support that any plot to oust Pak would require in order to be successful.

2. Subversion (S)

The most serious subversive threat is the effort by North Korea to overthrow the Seoul government in order to bring about a unified Communist Korea. This effort is aided by the mountainous terrain, accessible coastal inlets—especially on the west coast—and South Korea's proximity to Communist areas on the Asian mainland, all of which make the country vulnerable to infiltration by insurgent units and agents. However, there also are formidable barriers to Communist penetration and subversion: the growing political stability and economic progress which began in the mid-1960's; the presence of well-trained and well-equipped contingents of the South Korean and U.S. armed forces; effective internal security; and the basic anti-Communist orientation of the South Korean people, engendered by bitter memories of the Korean war.

North Korea's intensive campaign of subversion and espionage against South Korea has taken different forms over the years. After liberation from Japan in 1945, Communist activity was carried on openly in South Korea and funneled through the South Korean Labor (Communist) party until 1947, when the U.S. occupation authorities banned all Communist activity. In 1949 the party was outlawed by the newly established South Korean government. That same year the SKLP merged with its North Korean counterpart to form the Korean Labor Party. Communist activity then went underground, and guerrillas were active until the Korean war ended in 1953. From that time until 1966, North Korea relied mainly on propaganda and agent activity.

In 1966 P'yongyang supplanted its long-touted line of "peaceful unification" with an aggressive call for a revolution of all "patriotic" South Korean forces. Then in 1967 and 1968 North Korea strengthened its

paramilitary units and stepped up military pressure and violence. By 1969, however, apparently convinced that violence was not furthering its unification goals, P'yongyang made a tactical shift and retreated from violence. This shift has been reflected by a marked decline in the number of North Korean-initiated incidents directed against the South. Only four were reported in 1972—there were no casualties—compared with a total of 1,490 agent-related incidents in 1967 and 1968, with casualties numbering some 366 killed and 656 wounded, including 31 U.S. personnel killed and 118 wounded.

This reduction in violence has been accompanied by a more conciliatory North Korean posture toward the South. Throughout 1970 and 1971 P'yongyang set forth proposals for dealing with South Korea which gradually modified the hard-line position the regime had previously espoused. By August 1971 the North Koreans were calling for talks with representatives of the ruling party in Seoul, and in the same month P'yongyang readily agreed to a South Korean offer to begin talks through their respective Red Cross societies on reuniting members of families separated by the war. On 4 July 1972 the two Koreas announced an agreement to eschew hostility and work toward national unification.

P'yongyang's adoption of a softer policy toward Seoul does not imply any change in its basic objectives. Instead it indicates that North Korea recognizes its inability—for the time being—of gaining control of the South by violent means, and that its ends are better served by more peaceful tactics. P'yongyang believes that the development of a peaceful dialog with Seoul will provide opportunities to penetrate the South's more open society. An article in the North Korean party theoretical journal *Kulloje*, in April 1972 made just this point, defending the regime's decision to open negotiations with Seoul as a necessary step toward "opening up" the South to the forces of revolution.

Whatever future opportunities the North Koreans may find for subverting the South, their efforts thus far have only served to drive the people of South Korea closer to their government. Communist propaganda may have had a measure of success among the unemployed and the younger generation, and probably would have greater appeal if economic and political conditions were to deteriorate. There is no evidence that the North Koreans have effectively penetrated the higher levels of the military, the government, or any major social organization.

The two North Korean agencies primarily responsible for operations against the South are the Korean Labor Party's Liaison Department (LB) and the North Korean Army's Reconnaissance Bureau (RB). The latter organization had the main responsibility during 1965-68 for sending armed guerrilla teams into the South, while the LB infiltrated small agent teams for recruiting and other political tasks. From 1966 to 1968, when the North escalated the use of violence against the South to its highest point since the Korean war, the RB's mission included the infiltration of armed teams into the South Korean hinterland to explore possibilities for renewed guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and sabotage of public installations, including railroads. In January 1968 one heavily armed team came close to reaching the Blue House, the presidential residence, with the mission of assassinating President Pak. When these tactics failed, the number of North Korean paramilitary personnel reportedly was reduced by two-thirds. In 1969 the LB reemerged as the chief director of agent activities, with emphasis on recruiting, propaganda dissemination, and intelligence collection in the South.

North Korea also tries to subvert South Korean students, businessmen, and travelers abroad, as well as fishermen seized in or near South Korean waters. The largest operation involves *Chosen Soren*, which tries to recruit South Korean citizens living or traveling in Japan.

The North Koreans have successfully set up spy rings from time to time. In 1968 the ROK Central Intelligence Agency cracked two espionage groups operating in the southernmost area of the country—the United Revolutionary Party and the South Korean Liberation Strategy Party. Both were aimed at fomenting anti-American and antigovernment sentiment while preparing for armed terrorism against the government in the 1970's. The second ring was allegedly controlled by *Chosen Soren*.

F. Maintenance of internal security (S)

1. Police

The Korean National Police (KNP) is primarily a civil law-enforcement organization, but it also plays an important role in local defense and rear-area security, conducts domestic intelligence operations, and carries out many lesser duties which in Western countries would not normally be associated with a police force.

The KNP has apprehended the great majority of enemy agents caught each year. Its countersubversive intelligence operations are supervised and coordinated by the Central Intelligence Agency's Fifth Bureau

(Intelligence and Investigations), while its counterinfiltration operations are directed by the National Coordination Council. Since 1968 the KNP has also been given the task of training and controlling the Homeland Defense Reserve Force, which is made up of about 2 million older army reservists.

The KNP's domestic intelligence operations include monitoring the activities of opposition political parties, student groups, labor unions, and foreign residents—an effort which is greatly expanded at times of political tension, such as in 1972 just before the November referendum on changing the constitution to increase the powers of the President. Because the government tries to promote the concept of a police force separate from politics, these operations usually are performed discreetly.

The KNP's miscellaneous duties include fighting fires, collecting census data, enforcing industrial safety, and licensing establishments and persons providing public services and entertainment. A small force of policewomen controls traffic, investigates female security suspects, cares for abandoned children, and is active in vice control. The Coastal Police—a branch of the KNP—are charged with preventing illegal landings and smuggling, giving aid to vessels in distress, protecting South Korean fishing fleets, and patrolling inland and offshore waterways.

The line of control over the police extends from the President through the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Home Affairs to the director of the National Police Bureau, who is appointed by the President and is the nation's highest ranking police officer. The KNP is organized as a single national police force. Provincial governors, mayors, and lesser local government heads have no authority over police personnel stationed in their areas.

There is a subordinate police bureau in each province and in the cities of Seoul and Pusan. The provinces are subdivided into police districts, which generally coincide with the civil administrative districts, and a police station in each district serves as district headquarters. In addition, each township (*myon*) has at least one police substation, or "box," where local officers and communication facilities are located. Local police officers do not patrol a beat as policemen do in the United States; unless needed elsewhere, they usually stay in or near the police box.

From a strength of 10,000 in 1945, the KNP increased to approximately 75,000 during the Korean war. After the armistice in 1953 the number was gradually reduced until it reached an authorized strength of about 35,000 by 1966. In that year increased North Korean infiltration activities prompted legislation to expand police strength. By April 1973 the KNP had been increased to about 49,000 personnel, about 4,800 of whom are organized into Combat Police Companies. These companies are antiguerrilla units used for conducting mobile strikes and for controlling the coast.

The KNP operates with a limited budget (about US$70 million in 1972), and its arms, communications, and transportation are still inadequate, although they have improved since the mid-1960's. KNP equipment in April 1973 included 10 liaison-type aircraft—8 fixed-wing aircraft and 2 helicopters—and 45 small patrol boats. The capabilities of the KNP's 800-man maritime arm are limited by the small size and advanced age of the boats available and the inadequacy of ship-to-shore communications.

KNP personnel are generally loyal, well disciplined, and quite capable of enforcing the law and maintaining public order. Since the early 1960's they have improved their capability for controlling student demonstrations and riots. They are handicapped, however, by lack of cooperation from a public which—while supporting the KNP's counterintelligence activities—has hated the police for decades. The Pak regime does not use the police for outright political repression, as did the Japanese and Rhee regimes, but police brutality still occurs. The treatment of arrested persons has improved since Rhee's overthrow in 1960, but suspects occasionally are detained or held incommunicado without strict adherence to judicial processes. Torture is still used as a method of interrogation, but its use has declined.

Morale is only fair. Government efforts to improve the morale and the public image of the KNP by depicting the force as apolitical have had only partial success. Low pay still encourages petty corruption and prompts widespread resignations, especially among the junior ranks, while slow promotions cause depressed morale in the higher echelons. Police venality, however, has been considerably reduced.

2. Countersubversion and counterinsurgency measures and capabilities

The legal basis for South Korea's countersubversive activity is embodied in the National Security Law and the Anti-Communist Law. These all-inclusive laws are often broadly construed in order to prosecute persons who displease the regime as well as those charged with subversive offenses. Arrests, imprisonment, and trials often are conducted with little regard for legal niceties. Martial law is imposed whenever the government feels

the need to dampen or forestall a potentially explosive situation, such as antigovernment student demonstrations.

The South's comprehensive security and counterinfiltration system is headed by the National Coordination Council (NCC), which is chaired by the Prime Minister and includes senior representatives from the CIA, the Economic Planning Board, and the Ministries of Home Affairs (which controls the Korean National Police), National Defense, Justice, and Culture and Public Information. The Director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Ministry of National Defense) is secretary of the NCC and directs a Special Operations Center for counterinfiltration activities which has been set up within the Joint Chiefs of Staff mechanism. At the provincial level, coordinating committees with similarly broad representation act under guidance from Seoul. Military operations in the countryside are coordinated by nine provincial and six special military sector defense commands.

The ROK Army has 19 battalions for special counterinfiltration missions, and the National Police have trained and deployed 37 Combat Police Companies. A Homeland Defense Reserve Force (HDRF), drawn primarily from an army reserve of about 2 million men, has been established as a militia force to assist army and police units in guarding installations and apprehending rear-area infiltrators. HDRF personnel, however, are issued arms only when training or on duty.

The ROK CIA, which is under the direct control of the President, has wide responsibilities for investigating and combating all types of domestic and foreign threats to the regime. It closely monitors the activities of politicians and students, finances and controls the policies of some newspapers and, through informants, suppresses the publication of news in other news media; it has even manipulated the stock market. It reportedly interferes in the conduct of foreign policy, and its long arm reaches into foreign countries, where South Korean students are kept under close surveillance and even arrested by CIA officers. The CIA may also exercise some control over the promotion and assignment of military personnel—particularly of those assigned to it.

The CIA's Fifth Bureau (Intelligence and Investigations) specializes in counterespionage and in cases involving subversion and treason. It collects and analyzes reports on communism and other security problems and is responsible for recommending and implementing suitable countermeasures. It coordinates and controls the operations of other South Korean intelligence organizations that are targeted against the Communists, and it is responsible for communications intelligence. (For further details on the CIA, see the chapter on Intelligence and Security in this General Survey.)

The Army Security Command (ASC) was established in late 1968 with a major responsibility for guarding against any plots to overthrow the Pak regime. Replacing the army's powerful Counterintelligence Corps, the ASC concentrates on more effective monitoring of South Korean military communications and on developing a better informant system within the military. It also has a mandate to place informants in every government agency. (For further details, see the Intelligence and Security Chapter.)

Under CIA direction and supervision, the KNP shares responsibilities with the other intelligence services for counterinsurgency, countersubversion, and counterespionage—including the prevention of infiltration by Communist agents. Coordination and collaboration between the KNP and the other services have been hampered by varying degrees of discord.

The South Korean Government has several programs designed to support its overall counterinfiltration efforts. Its amnesty program is designed to induce North Koreans to defect and agents to surrender to the South Korean authorities. A number of laws and decrees insure that such persons will receive monetary awards, preferential treatment, and full pardons—the latter, however, subject to presidential approval. Gratuitous pay allowances for defectors range from the equivalent of US$741 for the lowest category (enlisted men below the rank of sergeant) to the equivalent of $3,704 for general grade officers or equivalent ranks. While the rewards are considered quite attractive, there have been few takers because of the difficulty in reaching potential defectors.

For many years the government has sponsored a well-publicized bounty-reward program. Any South Korean citizen may collect as much as the equivalent of US$741 for information leading to the apprehension of an enemy agent, and citizens are asked to report the appearance of strangers or the observance of suspicious actions. In addition, many provincial and district police headquarters stations conduct their own impromptu bounty programs, using police funds. Through these local programs many citizens have unofficially received rewards ranging from token gifts such as cigarettes, lighters, and wine glasses to more expensive items such as clocks. The KNP, the CIA, and the ASC have extensive citizens' intelligence networks throughout South Korea and funds available for remunerating informants.

The performance of South Korean security forces is generally good, although they have lost some of their elan as armed North Korean harassment of the South has decreased. The barriers against enemy infiltration are particularly well developed along the Demilitarized Zone, where a relatively short land frontier (approximately 150 miles from coast to coast) and the passing of more than two decades since the cessation of hostilities have permitted the South Koreans to construct formidable defenses. The government also attempts to maintain a high level of security in coastal areas. The coasts are patrolled by the ROK Navy and Coastal Police, and offshore air patrols are conducted by the ROK Air Force. There also is an extensive coast-watch system that includes shore-based radar and manned observation posts.

Despite these measures, the country's long coastline and numerous offshore islands are particularly vulnerable to infiltrators. Once the infiltrators are ashore, however, their position is made much more difficult by an unsympathetic populace that has demonstrated its willingness to cooperate with the authorities, even at great personal risk.

One problem with which security authorities have had to deal is the fact that large numbers of personnel are needed to run down enemy infiltrators in the more remote and rugged mountainous areas of the interior. At the height of the North's 1966-68 campaign of violence against the South, as many as 15,000 regular troops and substantially greater numbers of militia and police were deployed against a group of 120 heavily armed North Korean agents who infiltrated the Ulchin area. The South Koreans have also experienced command and communications difficulties in coordinating often competing security organizations, but some of this overlapping of responsibilities has been eliminated in recent years.

The government's New Community Movement (*Sae Maul Undong*) is a force for strengthened internal security. In addition to providing a greater measure of political control, particularly over more remote villages and farmsteads, it has been gotten access roads constructed into heretofore isolated areas that have been vulnerable to North Korean infiltration. In some instances villagers have been relocated to "defensive hamlets," but this has not been done on a massive scale. The many internal security measures imposed by the government have caused some resentment among the populace in the affected areas, but generally the authorities are sensitive to local feelings and try to avoid actions that might antagonize the residents.

In order to foster loyalty to the nation and pride in its cultural achievements, the government sponsors special art exhibits and has established a number of awards and prizes for the work of native artists. The principal national holidays—such as Samil Day on 1 March, commemorating the abortive "Declaration of Independence" from the Japanese in 1919, and the anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Korea on 15 August—are celebrated with official ceremonies and considerable public enthusiasm.

C. Selected bibliography (U/OU)

Grajdanzev, Andrew J., *Modern Korea*. New York: The John Day Co., 1944. A detailed discussion of Korea under Japanese rule.

Hahm, Pyong-choon, *The Korean Political Tradition and Law*. Seoul: Hollym Press, 1967. An analysis of the impact of Korean law and social practices on the political tradition.

Henderson, Gregory, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. A former U.S. Foreign Service officer describes Korean political dynamics through the years.

Lee, Chong-sik, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963. An account of the dynamics which created Korea's strong nationalist spirit.

McCune, George M., *Korea Today*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950. A description of North and South Korea in the years immediately following World War II.

Nelson, Frederick M., *Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1945. This description of past Korean governments presents an informative backdrop for the current political scene.

Kim, Se-jin, *The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1971. An analysis of military revolution and government in South Korea.

Articles on political subjects in *Asian Survey*, *Asiatic Research Bulletin*, *Korea Journal*, *Korean Affairs*, *Korean Report*, and *Korean Quarterly*.

Chronology (u/eu)

1910
August

Korea is formally annexed by Japan, ending 500-year rule of Yi dynasty.

1943
December

China, the United Kingdom, and the United States assert in Cairo that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent."

1945
August

U.S.S.R. enters war against Japan. Allies order Japanese in Korea to surrender to Soviet forces north of 38th parallel and to U.S. forces south of it.

December

The United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and the United States agree at Moscow on "reestablishment of Korea as an independent state" following a period of trusteeship by the United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and China; China subsequently concurs.

1946
March

U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission is established to assist in forming a provisional Korean government; discussions lead to deadlock on major problems.

1948
May

U.N.-supervised elections are held in South Korea but rejected by Communists in North Korea.

August

Republic of Korea is established in the south, with Syngman Rhee (Yi Sung-man) as first President.

September

Democratic People's Republic of Korea is established in the north, with Kim Il-song as Premier.

December

U.N. General Assembly declares the Republic of Korea the legitimate government in South Korea.

Soviet troops are evacuated from North Korea.

1949
June

All U.S. troops are withdrawn from South Korea except for a small military training mission.

1950
June

North Korean forces invade South Korea.

October

U.N. forces cross 38th parallel in pursuit of North Korean forces; Chinese Communist forces intervene.

1953
July

Armistice agreement between U.N. Command and North Korean-Chinese Communist side signed at P'anmunjom.

October

United States-Korea Mutual Defense Treaty is signed.

1954
April–May

"Geneva principles," as basis for settlement of overall Korean question, formulated at Geneva Conference on Korea.

1956
May

Rhee reelected President for third term, but opposition leader Chang Myon (John M. Chang) defeats Rhee's running mate for vice presidency.

1960
March

President Rhee and Liberal Party gain sweeping victory by rigging elections.

April

Student demonstrations in Seoul against election rigging lead to violence and declaration of martial law; Rhee resigns and Foreign Minister Ho Chong becomes acting president.

June

National Assembly passes constitutional amendment adopting parliamentary form of government.

August

Yun Po-son becomes President and Chang Myon becomes Prime Minister of Second Republic, following Democratic Party victory in general elections.

1961
May

Military junta led by Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui and Col. Kim Chong-p'il seizes government in bloodless coup.

June

Supreme Council for National Reconstruction assumes all executive and legislative power.

1962
December

Major constitutional changes ratified in national referendum.

1963
October

General Pak wins narrow victory over former President Yun Po-son in presidential elections.

December

General Pak inaugurated as President of Third Republic.

1965
January

National Assembly votes to send noncombat troops to South Vietnam.

August

National Assembly approves dispatch of first combat troops to South Vietnam.

August–December

South Korea-Japan normalization accords ratified and instruments of ratification exchanged.

1966
March

National Assembly approves dispatch of additional combat troops to South Vietnam.

1967
February

Korea-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement enters into force.

May

Pak Chong-hui is reelected for second term as President.

1968
January

31-man North Korean commando squad tries to seize Blue House (presidential mansion) in Seoul.

1969
October

Constitutional change to permit presidential third term ratified in national referendum.

1971
April

Pak Chong-hui wins third term in close election by defeating Kim Tae-chung of the New Democratic Party.

August

Seoul proposes talks between North and South Korean Red Cross societies for purpose of reuniting families separated by the Korean war.

1971
September

Informal talks between Red Cross societies start.

December

President Pak declares state of national emergency to tighten controls on the populatiop in conjunction with the North-South talks.

1972
August

Formal Red Cross talks between North and South Korea begin.

October

President Pak declares martial law and abrogates constitution preparatory to making major government changes.

November

Constitution rewritten to give the President sweeping new powers.

December

Pak Chong-hui elected to extended 6-year term.

1973
March

Withdrawal of South Korean forces from South Vietnam completed.

Glossary (u/ou)

ABBREVIATION	KOREAN	ENGLISH
ASC		Army Security Command
Chosen Soren	*Zai Nihon Chosenjin (Japanese) Soren Gokai*	General Federation of Koreans Resident in Japan
CIA		Central Intelligence Agency
DP		Democratic Party
DRP		Democratic Republican Party
DUP		Democratic Unification Party
FKTU		Federation of Korean Trade Unions
KNP		Korean National Police
LP		Liberal Party
NCC		National Coordination Council
NCU		National Conference for Unification
NDP		New Democratic Party
SKLP		South Korean Labor Party